Bava Kamma 75: תַּשְׁלוּמֵי (אַרְבַּע) חֲמִשָּׁה אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא

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As we have seen (daf 64b) in cases where a thief is obligated to pay kenas – the penalties of two, four or five times the value of the stolen object (over and above returning the object or its value to his victim) – if the thief steps forward and admits his guilt, then he will only need to return the object (or pay back its value); he will not have to pay the penalty – in the language of the Gemara, “Modeh b’knas patur.”

While this ruling is accepted by all, there is a difference of opinion whether this will be true even if other witnesses testify against him. Rav believes that even if witnesses are found who can testify about this situation, once the thief has admitted his guilt, he is free from any obligations to pay the penalty. (Steinsaltz)

We examine the Rambam’s reasoning as to the fine paid for thievery then the scholarship of Prof Joel Kraemer (d.2018) on reading the Moreh Nevuchim and its pitfalls.

Bava Kamma 74: דְּלָא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין אוֹדִי

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The Gemora says that when Rabban Gamliel blinded the eye of Tavi his slave, he was “very happy.” Rashi explains that he was happy because he really wanted to emancipate him but was unable to do so since freeing a Canaanite slave is a violation of a prohibition, but since he blinded him, he would be free.

It seems that Rashi would disagree with the Ran (Gittin 20b b’dafei ha’rif) who says that freeing a slave follows the same rules as “lo sei’chanem,” that it is only prohibited if done for the purpose of the slave, but not if done for the need of the master.

Based on the Ra”n, it should have been permitted for Rabban Gamliel to free his slave since it brings joy to himself and is not for the benefit of the slave.

Tavi is a character who appears throughout the Gemara, identified as the slave belonging to Rabban Gamliel of Yavne. In all of these stories he is presented as someone who was well-known for his personal piety and learning.

We explore the scholarship of Prof Menachem Fish (son of mentor Harold Fish) who believes the Bavli is an essentially didactic work. It reconstructs the dynamics of the study hall in order to initiate future students into the world of Torah-study by extended example.

Bava Kamma 73: תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר – כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי

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Of all the amora’im, Abaye and Rava are presented as epitomizing the discussions that take place in the Gemara.

In all of their arguments in the Gemara, the halakha always follows Rava’s opinion, with only six exceptions. Those six are referred to by the Gemara by the acronym YAL KGM:

Abaye believes that any testimony that they gave from the time of their original statement can no longer be trusted, since from that time it is clear that they were unreliable.

Rava argues that the whole concept of zomemim is a hiddush – a new idea – established by the Torah, since logically there is no reason to trust the second group of witnesses more than the first.

We explore this wonderful relationship that kinda formed the basis for all amoraic discourse.

Bava Kamma 72: פְּסֵידָא דְלָקוֹחוֹת

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A new mishnah states with regard to one who stole an ox or a sheep, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered the animal or sold it, based on the testimony of two other witnesses, if both these witnesses and those witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses, the first set of witnesses, who testified about the theft of the animal, pay the alleged thief the double payment, which is what they had conspired to cause him to pay.

The Gemara then states: Abaye said: A zomeim witness is disqualified (for any other testimony) retroactively (from the time that he testified). Rava said: He is only disqualified from the time that he is found to be a zomeim.

The Gemora explains: Abaye said that he is disqualified retroactively, for it is at that time that he became an evildoer, for the Torah states: Do not place your hand with an evildoer to be a corrupt witness.

Rava said that he is only disqualified from the time that he is found to be a zomeim, for his disqualification is itself a novelty (so why should we stretch it). This is because the two sets of witnesses are two against two, so why should we listen to the second set more than the first?

Accordingly, we can only apply the disqualification novelty from the time that they become zomemin.

We explore differences between the Code of Hammurabi and our Torah texts applying to civil law and witnesses.

Bava Kamma 71: גָּנַב וְטָבַח בַּשַּׁבָּת

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In the context of discussing how halakha deals with responsibility for two actions, . he will deserve both a death penalty and to pay as a consequence of what he did – our Gemara quotes a Mishna from Massekhet Hullin (14a). It teaches that a person who performs shehita (ritual slaughter) of an animal on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur will receive the death penalty; nonetheless his shehita will be considered good, and the animal will be deemed kosher and can be eaten.

We explore the issue of chilul shabbat in performing another mitzvah as well as the iconic use of sabbath observance in The Big Lebowski!

Bava Kamma 70: גָּנַב וּמָכַר בְּשַׁבָּת

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A new Mishnah states:If according to two witnesses he stole (an ox or a sheep) and according to them, or according to another two, he slaughtered or sold it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payments. If a person stole and sold it on Shabbos; or he stole and sold it for idolatry; or he stole and slaughtered it on Yom Kippur; or he stole from his father and slaughtered or sold it and his father later died; or he stole and slaughtered it and later consecrated it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payments.

The Gemora asks from a braisa which stated that he is exempt from paying in this case!?

Rami bar Chamah answers: He is exempt in a case where the buyer said to the thief, “Cut a fig off of my tree, and I will acquire that which you have stolen.” [He is liable for death at the same time that he sold it; accordingly, he would be exempt from paying based upon the rule of kim leih bid’rabbah minei - whenever someone is deserving of two punishments, he receives the one which is more severe.]

Our Daf (and Bava Batra (56b) probes the ability of beit din to combine fragmented testimony. Often a halakha or verdict of beit din is a product of multiple fragments of information.

We explore further items like when stealing might be permitted and Klayman’s analysis of Punitive Damages.

Bava Kamma 69: הַצְּנוּעִין מַנִּיחִין אֶת הַמָּעוֹת

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In our daf Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one stole an item and the owner has not yet despaired of recovering it, neither of them is able to consecrate it. This one, the thief, cannot consecrate it because it does not belong to him, and that one, the owner, cannot consecrate it because it is not in his possession.

And there is a mishna of this kind (Ma’aser Sheni 5:1) that contradicts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, as we learned in a mishna: (Maaseh Sheni)

The mishna continues: But the pious ones would set aside some coins and say: Anything that was picked from this vine by passersby shall be desacralized onto these coins.These pious ones maintain that the owner can desacralize the grapes despite the fact that they are no longer in his possession. Similarly, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, they would claim that an owner can consecrate a stolen item even though it is no longer in his possession. Since this opinion is cited in the mishna without being attributed to any particular Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan should have accepted this ruling.

We explore the “pious ones” הַצְּנוּעִין with reference to the Early Medieval Hassidim and Prof Elliott Wolfson’s scholarship.

Bava Kamma 68: גְּנֵיבָה בְּנֶפֶשׁ תּוֹכִיחַ

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The Gemara asks another question with regard to the fourfold or fivefold payment…maybe this applies only in the specific case where the animal is sold after we heard that the owner despaired of its recovery (Yiush)?

The Sages respond to this and say:This cannot be since the thief’s sale of the animal must be similar to his slaughter of it.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Elazar: The case of stealing a human being, i.e., kidnapping, proves that your reasoning is incorrect. The Torah states:

“And he who steals a man and sells him or if he is found in his hand, he shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:16).

In this case there is no owner’s despair, as no one ever despairs of his own freedom. Consequently, the thief’s sale of the person he kidnapped is invalid, and yet the Torah states that he is liable to receive the death penalty for selling him.

We explore the kidnapping of the Jewish child,

Edgardo Levi Mortara and its repercussions to this day in the catholic church.

Bava Kamma 67: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנִּשְׁתָּרֵשׁ בַּחֵטְא

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Rebbi Akiva in a Beraisa says that the reason why a thief who slaughtered (Tavach) or sold (Machar) the animal he stole must pay back Arba'ah v'Chamishah is "Mipnei she'Nishtaresh ba'Chet" -- "because he became rooted in sin." What exactly does this mean?

(a) RASHI here writes that it means that the thief "made roots, meaning that he strengthened his sin by acquiring it and benefiting from his deeds." Rashi means that until the slaughter or sell of the animal, the thief did not acquire the animal entirely, but rather it was still considered in the possession of its original owner. (The thief has only a "Kinyan Gezeilah" which removes the animal from the "domain" (Reshus) of the owner, but not from the "ownership" (Mamon) of the owner.)

When the thief slaughters or sells the animal, he acquires it entirely. His deed removes the animal entirely from the ownership of the owner. "He strengthened his sin" refers to the sin he did initially when he stole the animal.

We explore the differences between Arba'ah v’Chamishah 4x and 5x and possible reasons.

Bava Kamma 66: יֵאוּשׁ אֵינוֹ קוֹנֶה

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A change to the stolen object effects its acquisition by a thief. He is still liable for his theft, but if he kills and sells an ox or sheep, he is not liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment because now he slaughters his own animal.

In the phrase "...and he shall return the stolen article that he stole..." the extra words "as he stole" teach that if the article is as it was when he stole, he returns the article, but if the thief transformed it, he is not required to return the stolen article itself, but rather its value.

The rabbis debate whether or not ye'ush makes sense.

What if matzah was stolen but peach elapses by the time that the thief has been found? Why wouldn't the thief say that he will simply return the matzah? Why would the thief consider the matzah, now useless, to have been acquired?

The rabbis consider the thief's opinion and the opinion of the person who despairs the loss of the matzah. They determine that if the victim does not want their item returned, as it is useless, then the robber should pay the value of the matzah even if he no longer wishes to acquire it.

We explore the possible scenarios of the more fascinating phenomena in halakha in which a mitzva and aveira intersect.

Bava Kamma 65: כִּי נָיֵים וְשָׁכֵיב

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A thief pays the principal according to the value of the stolen article when he stole it, and he pays the twofold payment, fourfold, and fivefold payments according to the value of the stolen article when he is sued in court.

If, however, the stolen article is still in the thief's original state, he returns the article as is.

Shulchan Aruch discusses the liability of someone who stole property worth one zuz and by the time the thief was brought to Beis Din the item increased in value to four zuz. If the thief slaughtered, sold, broke, or lost the item at the time it was worth four zuz the thief will have to pay four zuz.

We explore the increase or decreased value of stolen property and how Jewish Law may have been influenced by the Sicarii robbers.

Bava Kamma 64: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס

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Our perek focuses on kenas – the penalties of two, four or five times the value of the stolen object that is paid by a thief over and above returning the object or its value to his victim. There is an exception to this rule. If the thief steps forward and admits his guilt, then he will only need to return the object (or pay back its value); he will not have to pay the penalty.

One explanation for this law is that the obligation to pay the kenas is not an inherent obligation, rather it is one that is imposed on him by the Jewish court. Once the thief admits his guilt, the court is never called upon to rule on the case, so there is no opportunity for them to impose the penalty.

We explore the penalties with and without confession and the differences between Geneiva and gezeilah.

Bava Kamma 63: בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר תְּאַוֶּה נַפְשְׁךָ

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The Gemara asks: anywhere that the Torah wrote the word kol isn’t it an amplification? But with regard to second tithe, the word kol is written in the verse:

“And you shall bestow the money for whatever [bekhol] your soul desires, for oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink, or for whatever your soul asks of you”(Deuteronomy 14:26)?

And yet we expound that verse as a generalization, and a detail,and a generalization.

We explore the “soul desires” in a broader from a sociological, psychological sense and from chassidic and Jungian perspectives.

Bava Kamma 62: נֵר חֲנוּכָּה – מִצְוָה לְהַנִּיחָהּ בְּתוֹךְ עֲשָׂרָה

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Our Mishnah states:

In the case of a camel that was laden with flax and was passing through the public domain, and its flax extended into a store and the flax caught fire from a lamp in the store belonging to the storekeeper, and as a result of the burning flax the camel set fire to the building together with all its contents, the owner of the camel is liable.

Ravina said in the name of Rava: Conclude from Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that the mitzva is to place the Hanukkah lamp within a height of ten handbreadths from the ground

The Sages say in response: No, there is no proof from here. Actually, I could say to you that one may place a Hanukkah lamp even above a height of ten handbreadths..

We explore the height of the Chanukiah…and the placing of menorahs in public spaces.

Bava Kamma 61: טָמוּן בָּאֵשׁ

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If one sends forth a fire, i.e., allows it to escape, and it consumes wood, or stones, or earth, he is liable, as it is stated: “If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field, is consumed, the one who kindled the fire shall pay compensation” (Exodus 22:5), which teaches that he is liable also for destroying the field itself.

We explore the history and art of haystacks.

Bava Kamma 60: כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּיתַּן רְשׁוּת לַמַּשְׁחִית

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“And none of you shall go out of the opening of his house until the morning” (Exodus 12:22)? If the plague was not decreed upon the Jewish people, why were they not permitted to leave their homes? Once permission is granted to the destroyer to kill, it does not distinguish between the righteous and the wicked. And not only that, but it begins with the righteous first.

We explore how modern plagues such as Corona virus impact faith and the seemingly arbitrary afflictions of even babies using the tools of theodicy and tradition.

Bava Kamma 59: שִׁלַּח בְּיַד פִּקֵּחַ

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Our daf discusses a number of options regarding one who fans a flame which causes damage to another's property. Is one's breath the same as the wind? What if the wind was fanning the flame while a person was using his breath on the flame? What if the wind was stronger than the person's breath? What if the wind was typical? Or atypical?

We explore the use of fire in antiquity and the science behind the interaction between wind and fire in natural disasters and their legal implications for liability.

Bava Kamma 58: מַבְרִיחַ אֲרִי

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The Gemora asks: Indeed, why don’t we say that the case in the Mishnah is akin to a case of chasing away a lion from his friend’s possessions (where the friend does not have to pay for the chasing)? The Gemora answers: The case of chasing away the lion was done (knowingly and) willingly, unlike the produce acting as a cushion that was not done with the consent of the owner of the produce.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers: When one chases away a lion, he does not incur a loss, as opposed to this case where he did incur a loss (as his produce was crushed by the animal’s fall).

Tosfos rules that the lion chaser is not entitled for compensation only in cases where it is not definite that the lion will cause a loss, for instance, where the lion is far away from the sheep, but he is concerned that it might come closer. However, if he would chase away the lion when the damage is imminent, for instance, where the sheep is already in the mouth of the lion, he is entitled for compensation.

We continue our exploration of the lion in antiquity including Herodotus' description of the Greek allies setting loose the lions against the Persian army, led by Xerxes.

Bava Kamma 57: שֶׁהוּחְלְקָה בְּמֵימֵי רַגְלֶיהָ

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Our masechta continues its discussion of payment "to the extent of the benefit" [ma she-nehenet]. Even when, for one reason or another, there is no liability in the context of the laws of damage, a person is still obligated to pay a person from whom he derived benefit the amount of that benefit, this being similar to the argument that "mamoni gabakh" ("my property is in your possession").

Regarding, [a case where an animal tripped and had the blow cushioned by landing on produce that did not belong to his owner, and the owner of the damaged produce, even if, for whatever reason, he will not get paid the full value of the damaged fruit, would still like to at least be paid for the benefit derived by the animal from the lessening of] the impact, we might have said that this is a case of "driving away a lion away from a neighbor's property" [mavri'ach ari], so that no payment should be made even to the extent of the benefit.

It is therefore indicated to us [here that even this benefit has to be paid for].

We look at the history the lion in rabbinic Literature and its use as metaphor for the divine.

Bava Kamma 56: וְהוּא שֶׁחָתְרָה

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The mishna teaches: If the pen was breached at night, or bandits breached it, and sheep subsequently went out and caused damage, the owner of the sheep is exempt. Rabba says: And this first instance of a pen that was breached is referring specifically to a case where the animal tunneled under the wall of the pen and by doing so caused the wall to collapse. In that case, the owner is completely blameless and therefore exempt from liability for any damage that ensues.

The Gemara asks: But if the animal did not tunnel under the wall, what is the halakha? Would the owner be liable? What are the circumstances?

We explore the zoology and evolutionary advantage of tunneling in animals.