Shavuot 30: וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים

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The fourth perek of Massekhet Shevuot begins on today’s daf, and – as its name Shevuat HaEdut (The Oath of Testimony) indicates – its focus is on oaths taken in response to a demand that someone testify about something that he witnessed, and he refuses to testify. This law is based on the passage in Sefer Vayikra (5:1).

The Mishna opens by listing who is included in this law and who is exempt from it. Thus, the law applies only to men and not to women, it does not apply to relatives who cannot testify nor to people who are removed from testimony because of forbidden acts that they committed (e.g. if they are robbers).

Shavuot 29: קַיִּימוּ כׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ

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If someone takes an oath that something is different than what is known to be, this is a shevuas shav. For example, if someone takes an oath that a pillar of stone is gold, or that a certain man is in fact a woman, or that a certain woman is in fact a man, this is a shevuas shav.

It is interesting to note that although a person who takes such a shevuat shav will be liable to bring a sacrifice, had he taken a neder such as this, he would not be held responsible in any way, as we would assume that he is simply exaggerating, or speaking in a manner that is not serious.

A second new Mishna teaches us more about oaths said in vain. We are taught that vain oaths regarding oneself apply to both men and women, relatives and strangers, people who are qualified to testify and people who are not qualified to testify, inside of the beit din and outside of the beit din. If one transgresses, s/he is either lashed or s/he brings an offering. A person can put an oath on someone else if that someone answers, "amen" after the person has stated the oath.

Shavuot 28: אִישְׁתַּבַּשְׁתְּ

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Building upon previous research establishing philosophical allegories as frameworks for healing relationships and the application of tzimtzum hermeneutics to patient narratives, this paper synthesizes traditional parabolic discourse with contemporary therapeutic practice through comparative analysis of Kafka, Benjamin, and Rebbe Nachman's parabolic thought. This study extends our prior work on Plato's Cave versus Ramchal's maze metaphors and mystical hermeneutics in medical encounters by examining how classical parabolic traditions provide interpretive frameworks for understanding patients as "living parables." Drawing on established foundations of patient-as-sacred-text methodology and covenantal therapeutic relationships, we demonstrate how traditional mashal structures parallel contemporary hermeneutic approaches to clinical practice. This analysis reveals how parabolic interpretation challenges reductionist biomedicine while offering robust philosophical foundations for integrative healing practice that honors both scientific rigor and spiritual depth.

Shavuot 27: עָלְתָה לוֹ שְׁנִיָּה תַּחְתֶּיהָ

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The Talmud often interrogates the problem of speech without sincere intent, a form of halakhic lip service. For example:

A person says, “I swear I will fast,” but says it jokingly or in anger.

Does the external form of the statement bind them, even if their heart was not in it?

Schick argues that these cases reveal the Talmud’s discomfort with legal automation—the idea that words alone, detached from context and sincerity, should generate obligation.

This leads to the idea of legal interpretation as psychoanalysis: the Beit Din must discern what was meant, not merely what was said.

Thought Without Speech: Can the Heart Alone Obligate?

The inverse question also arises: if someone intended to take a vow but never uttered it, is it binding?

The general rule in the Talmud is: “Devarim shebalev einam devarim” — “unspoken thoughts are not legally significant” (Kiddushin 49b).

We struggle between lip service and affairs of the heart.

Shavuot 26: ״בִּשְׂפָתַיִם״ וְלֹא בַּלֵּב

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What if one only thinks the oath? Is it necessary to speak the oath aloud be liable if the oath is broken? A baraita notes that an oath is not in the heart alone. If a person resolved in his heart to say an oath but never spoke it aloud, some rabbis say that he is not liable. However, the rabbis determine that an oath must be spoken.

Which leads us to the thorny issue of lip service from the semantic and metaphoric perspective.

Shavuot 25: אִם רִיבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ, רִיבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ

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We have already noted the basic difference between a neder and a shevua that is commented on by the Gemara. While a neder acts on an object (e.g. a person declares that meat is forbidden to him), a shevua acts on the person (e.g. he accepts upon himself a prohibition that will keep him from eating meat).

The case of the Mishna on our daf, where someone takes a shevua that he will not sleep, will only work if it is an oath, since “sleep” is not an object, and it can only become forbidden by means of a shevua (which will create a prohibition on the person keeping him from sleeping).

We explore the physiology of sleep and insomnia as a mark of asceticism.

Shavuot 24: אִיסּוּר כּוֹלֵל

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Can someone add shevuot on to existing shevuot? Can he “pile on” additional prohibitions to ones that exist already?

The Gemara on our daf introduces us to two concepts that may allow him to do just that: issur kollel and issur mosif.

Issur kollel means an inclusive prohibition. In a case of issur kollel we do not find an extra prohibition added, rather the new issur expands the context of the already existing prohibition so that this activity is now included under a different category at the same time that it retains its original prohibition.

An example of this is a nevela – non-kosher meat that is forbidden in-and-of itself – that is eaten on Yom Kippur. Since Yom Kippur creates a situation wherein all food is prohibited, the nevela will gain a second prohibition in addition to its basic prohibition.

Issur mosif means an additional, or expanded, prohibition. There are some cases where the issur does not fall under a larger category that adds a prohibition to it, rather there is an actual addition made to it that did not exist beforehand.

Shavuot 23: כִּי אָמְרִינַן אִיסּוּר כּוֹלֵל

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The Gemara on our daf asks why the first tanna distinguishes between food that is not edible and food that is forbidden, since from a halakhic perspective, forbidden food is also not considered edible!

We return to the prior discussion regarding the liability of the Am Haaretz vs Talmid Chacham as well as the archetype of the pious fool .

Shavuot 22: קוּנָּם אִשְׁתִּי נֶהֱנֵית לִי

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If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate foods that are inedible or drank liquids that are not potable, he is exempt. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he atethe meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable.

And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since he is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat them and an oath cannot take effect where another oath is in force. But if he said: It iskonam for my wife to derive benefit from me if I ate today, and he had eaten carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, his wife is prohibited from deriving benefit from him.

We explore the possible reciprocity of the wife makes the oath

And the ascetic tendencies of the Ramban whether it might have been influenced by his disputation with the Dominicans.

Shavuot 21: רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, בְּכל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ

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Since an oath usually involves speech with no action, is it considered to be a lav she-ein bo ma’aseh, or, perhaps, the act of speaking is considered significant?

On our daf Rabbi Yehuda is brought quoting Rabbi Yosei HaGelili as teaching that there are three exceptions to the rule of no punishment for a lav she-ein bo ma’aseh.

The three exceptions are nishba (taking a false oath), meimar (announcing one’s intent to switch one consecrated animal for another) u’mekalel et ḥaveiro ba-shem (cursing one’s fellow while invoking the name of God).

It appears, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the Gemara does not consider speech to be an action, yet nevertheless, these types of speech are presented by the Torah as exceptions to the rule and malkot (lashes) will be given to someone who transgresses them.

In the Mishnah (19b), R’ Akiva holds that if someone takes an oath that he will not eat, he is liable for violating his oath as soon as he eats even the smallest amount even less than the volume of an olive (כזית).

We explore the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages concerning a person who swears that he will not eat, whether he breaks his oath with even minimal eating or only if he eats food the size of an olive (ke-zayit) including a general discussion concerning the definition of the act of eating, and the role of the measure of a ke-zayit in this context.

And a focus on the ethnography of eating as a ritual.

Shavuot 20: כַּיּוֹם שֶׁמֵּת בּוֹ אָבִיו

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In the Torah we find that it is forbidden to take a shevuat sheker – a false oath (see Vayikra 19:12) – and also a shevuat shav – an oath taken in vain (see Shemot 20:6). What is the difference between them?

Rav Dimi quotes Rabbi Yoḥanan as teaching that a shevuat sheker is a false oath taken regarding the future that is not kept, while a shevuat shav is an oath in vain about something that happened in the past. The Gemara on our daf challenges this opinion with a baraita that teaches that these two are the same but explains that this means that the two were taught simultaneously – they were said at the same time in a manner that allowed the listener to realize that two similar laws were being taught and understand the nuance of difference between them.

If one says "It is hereby incumbent on me that I not eat meat nor drink wine, as on the day on which my father died (source for fasting on a yahrtzeit), or as on the day when Gedaliyah ben Achikam was killed (fast of the 3rd of Tishrei), or as on the day on which I viewed Jerusalem in its destruction" - he is indeed prohibited; and Shmuel commented on this, "This is only true if he already vowed from that day on.”

We explore the historical figure of Gedaliah…was he a victim or victimizer?

Shavuot 19: לִישָּׁנֵיהּ (דאיתקילא) [אִיתְּקִילא] לֵיהּ

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The third perek of Massekhet Shevuot begins on today’s daf and with it the Gemara turns its attention to the main subject of the tractate – the issue of oaths – a topic discussed in a number of places in the Torah.

In the Ten Commandments (see Shemot 20:6) the Torah forbids taking God’s Name in vain, which is understood to be referring to the context of an oath. In Sefer Vayikra the Torah forbids false oaths (see Vayikra 19:12). These types of oaths are referred to by the Sages as shevuot shav.

If the shevuat bituy was made regarding past events, if his statement was false, he is held liable immediately – if it was done knowingly, he will receive malkot (lashes) and if unknowingly, he will have to bring a sacrifice according to his financial standing.

Shevuat shav is a type of false oath, when a person takes an oath that he will do something that cannot be done, or if he tries to affirm a false statement that he made by means of an oath or if he swears for no reason at all. In these situations he will be liable to receive malkot if he did it knowingly, if unknowingly there is no punishment.

We explore the dispute between R Akiva and Ishmael through the lens of Heschel’s theory.

Shavuot 18: נוֹעֵץ עֶשֶׂר צִפּרְנָיו בַּקַּרְקַע

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Sexual relations when a woman is a nidda – from the time when her period begins until she goes to the mikveh after it is over – is forbidden. Transgressing that negative commandment carries with it the punishment of karet – the people will be “cut off” from the community. The Mishna (14b) discusses the case of someone who transgresses a positive commandment of nidda and explains that the positive commandment is when a couple is engaged in permissible intercourse, and the woman suddenly realizes that she has become a nidda. When she informs the man of her status, his obligation is to remain in place until his erection is lost in order to avoid sexual pleasure with a nidda.

This parallels the case of the individual who enters the Temple and becomes tameh while he is there, since in both cases the entry was permissible, and the problem developed at a later time. The difference is that in the Temple, the man who became ritually defiled must leave as quickly as possible, while in the case of the nidda the recommendation is to wait until it is appropriate to leave.

Shavuot 17: תַלמְיִד חכָםָ לזְוֹ ואְיֵן תַּלמְיִד חכָםָ לזָוֹ

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Sexual relations when a woman is a nidda – from the time when her period begins until she goes to the mikveh after it is over – is forbidden. Transgressing that negative commandment carries with it the punishment of karet – the people will be “cut off” from the community. The Mishna (14b) discusses the case of someone who transgresses a positive commandment of nidda and explains that the positive commandment is when a couple is engaged in permissible intercourse, and the woman suddenly realizes that she has become a nidda. When she informs the man of her status, his obligation is to remain in place until his erection is lost in order to avoid sexual pleasure with a nidda.

This parallels the case of the individual who enters the Temple and becomes tameh while he is there, since in both cases the entry was permissible, and the problem developed at a later time. The difference is that in the Temple, the man who became ritually defiled must leave as quickly as possible, while in the case of the nidda the recommendation is to wait until it is appropriate to leave.

Shavuot 16: קִידָּה – עַל אַפַּיִם

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Our daf discusses whether the kedusha of mikdash and yerushalayim (to the exclusion of kedushas ha'aretz - see tosafos) is still present nowadays.

The Rambam (Hil. Beis HaBechira 6:14) writes that the kedusha of the shechina cannot become batul.

§ The mishna teaches: If he bowed down, or he tarried in the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down, or he went out by way of a longer route when he could have taken a shorter route, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. Rava says: They taught this only when he bowed down in the Temple courtyard facing inward, toward the Holy of Holies, as that alone is proper bowing. But if he bowed down facing outward, that is not considered bowing. When he bows facing outward, if he tarried in the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down, yes, he is liable, but if he did not tarry long enough to bow down, he is not liable.

We continue to explore the prostrations and dancing in the temple as well as how we memorialize in liturgy.

Shavuot 15: בכנורות ובנבלים ובצלצלים

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§ The mishna teaches concerning the consecration of an addition to the city of Jerusalem or the Temple courtyard: And with a song. The Sages taught in a baraita: They sang the song of thanksgiving, i.e., Psalms, chapter 100, which begins:

“A psalm of thanksgiving,” accompanied by harps, lyres, and cymbals, at every corner and upon every large stone in Jerusalem. And they also recited Psalms, chapter 30, which begins:

“I will extol You, O Lord, for You have lifted me up,” and the song of evil spirits, i.e., Psalms, chapter 91, which begins: “He that dwells in the secret place of the Most High.” And some say that this psalm is called the song of plagues.

It is related that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi would recite these verses to protect him from evil spirits during the night and fall asleep while saying them. The Gemara asks: How could he do that? But doesn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi himself say: One is prohibited from healing himself with words of Torah? The Gemara answers: To protect oneself is different, as he recited these verses only to protect himself from evil spirits, and not to heal himself.

We explore music and instruments used in the Beis Hamikdash.

Shavuot 14: הפנימית נאכלת, והחיצונה נשרפת

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The second perek of Massekhet Shevuot, Perek Yediot HaTumah, begins on our daf, and continues the discussion of issues of ritual defilement.

From the simple reading of the Torah (see Vayikra 5:2-3) it would seem that coming into physical contact with a dead creature that gives off ritual defilement is, itself prohibited. Nevertheless, the tradition of the Sages is that there is nothing inherently wrong with touching such a creature; the only prohibition is for someone who is ritually defiled through such contact to enter the Temple precincts or spread that tumah to something consecrated.

The first Mishna repeats the teaching that appeared at the beginning of Massekhet Shevuot (see 2a), that the laws of yediot ha-tumah – recognizing that someone was ritually defiled and then interacted with the Temple or some consecrated object – have the same “two that are four” pattern that parallel the case of shevuot – oaths – in that they contain two basic concepts that include four ideas. The two concepts that are written in the Torah are that –

We examine purity laws from a historical and cultural perspective.

Shavuot 13: סתם סיפרא אסתם סיפרא

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Rav Yosef answers that the Mishna was authored by Rebbe, and he agrees with Rabbi Yehudah that all are included in the atonement of the sent goat. Abaye asked Rav Yosef why he said the author was Rebbe – was because Rabbi Yehudah does not agree with Rebbe, or was it simply because it is inappropriate to say that the senior author (Rabbi Yehudah) agrees with the junior author (Rebbe)? Rav Yosef answered that Rabbi Yehudah does not agree with Rebbe, so he had to say the author was Rebbe.

He proves this from a braisa from the sifra (which is always assumed to be Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion), which says that although Yom Kippur atones for intentional transgressions, it does not atone if one has not repented, since the verse qualifies it with the word ach – but.

The Gemora cites a contradictory sifra, which says that Yom Kippur atones even if one did not fast, did not commemorate it, and did work, since the verse categorically states yom kippurim hu – it is Yom Kippur. Abaye says that this second sifra was authored by Rebbe, and differs with the first one, authored by Rabbi Yehudah.

We explore the scholarship on midrash authorship specifically Sifrah (Toras Kohanim).

Shavuot 12: לָא זָז מִשָּׁם עַד שֶׁמּוֹחֲלִין לוֹ

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In the Mishnah, we learned that if a person is guilty of not fulfilling a positive commandment, the goat of Yom Kippur which is sent out for the procedure of עזאזל atones for him.

In its analysis of this halacha, the Gemara notes that if the person had not done teshuva, the atonement should apparently not be valid for him. The verse states (Mishlei 21:27): “The offering of the wicked is despised.”

And, on the other hand, if the person did do teshuva, he has achieved his atonement whatever day he expressed his remorse, as the Beraisa teaches that a person is forgiven immediately upon doing teshuva for neglectful lack of fulfillment of a positive commandment.

R. Isaac Arama (Spain, 15th century) says that the difference between an intentional and an unintentional sin is that in the former case, both the body and the soul were at fault. In the case of an unintentional sin only the body was at fault, not the soul. Therefore a physical sacrifice helps since it was only the physical act of the body that was in the wrong. A physical sacrifice cannot atone for a deliberate sin, because it cannot rectify a wrong in the soul.

Shavuot 11: שָׁאנֵי פָּרָה, הוֹאִיל וְדָמֶיהָ יְקָרִין

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Rabbi Shimon says that the meat of a red heifer that was slaughtered properly is susceptible to becoming ritually impure with the ritual impurity of food, even though it is prohibited to partake of it in its current state, since it had a time when it was fit to be eaten. And in explanation of when it was fit to be eaten, Reish Lakish says: Rabbi Shimon would say that a red heifer may be redeemed even while it is upon its arrangement of wood.

Rabba concedes however the case of a red heifer is different, since it is of great monetary value. Therefore, to avoid a great loss, the court makes a stipulation despite its being an uncommon case.

We explore the notion of bringing cows heifers other animals reminding the divine of the sin of the golden calf yet midrashically interacting “let the mother come and clean the calf’s poop, or let the father come and clean the child” How do we read these parables midrashically and mystically.