Bava Metzia 17: חָיְישִׁינַן לִשְׁנֵי שְׁוִירֵי

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The rabbis teach about debtors who first deny their debt, but when faced with witnesses, amend their statements, and admit that they already repaid that debt. These debtors are held to the presumptive status of one who denies that they owe a debt. Any subsequent claims are ignored. Similar consequences face those who claim that they are completely innocent when it comes to other cases - money, a cloak, an oath.

The rabbis wonder whether oaths should be treated with the same gravitas as the other claims. One might say that he will take an oath but later he reconsiders and does not take the oath.

The Rabbis stated this ruling before Rabbi Abbahu. He said to them: Rabbi Avin’s statement is reasonable in a case where one was obligated by a court to take an oath. But if one voluntarily obligated himself to take an oath, and he later claims that he took the oath, he is deemed credible. This is because a person is prone to say incidentally that he will take an oath and then change his mind; this does not render him a liar. The Rabbis then brought Rabbi Abbahu’s analysis back to Rabbi Avin and presented it before him. Rabbi Avin said to them: I also said this halakha specifically with regard to one who was obligated by a court to take an oath, as Rabbi Abbahu explained.

We explore the circumstances around lying in Halacha.

Bava Metzia 16: וְעָשִׂ֛יתָ הַיָּשָׁ֥ר וְהַטּ֖וֹב

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Our daf explains If the debtor pays his debt, he can reclaim his property at any point. Consequently, even bills of foreclosure or authorization might be obsolete, and nevertheless the mishna states that one who finds them must return them to the creditor.

Rather, Rava said that the mishna is not proof for the ruling of Shmuel for a different reason: There, this is the reason that the documents are returned: As I can say that if the debtor has already repaid his debt, it is he who caused the loss to himself, as at the time he repaid his debt he should have either ripped up the document, or alternatively, he should have demanded of the creditor to write another document for the debtor’s redeemed property, returning it to him.

The reason for a new document to be written is that according to the letter of the law, the land need not be returned by the creditor to the debtor, and it is due to the verse:

“You shall do that which is right and good in the eyes of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 6:18), that the Sages said that the land should be returned. Therefore, it is as though the debtor is purchasing it anew, and the creditor must write a bill of sale.

This leads us to an analysis of the struggle between the letter and the spirit of the law…and the biography of Prof Yosef Faur.

Bava Metzia 15: הָתָם הַלְוָאָה, הָכָא זְבִינֵי

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Shmuel’s opinions relating to shevach are discussed.

If one buys from a robber and invests in the property, he loses his investment because if the robber returns him his investment, it will look like interest. Various sources are brought to contradict this but are resolved.

According to Shmuel, a ba’al chov who comes to demand land from liened property, he can take the shevach, (the investment). Various sources are brought to prove or question his opinion and as a result some distinctions are made.

If one buys property and knows it is stolen, Rav and Shmuel debate whether or not he can get his money back.

Our Gemara examines a position put forward by Shmuel who rules that if the borrower cannot pay, then the lender can collect not only from the guaranteed field itself, but also from any increase in the value of the field that derives from the investment that the third-party purchaser made in the field. Rava explains that this rule is based on the standard contract that was written at the time that a field was sold, where the seller guarantees to the purchaser that he will make sure that the purchaser will be fully reimbursed should there be any problem with the purchase, the investment or the profits stemming from the sale.

We continue our exploration of scribal errors as well as the history of the textual emendation and redaction of the Mishnah.

Bava Metzia 14: סָבְרִי אַחְרָיוּת טָעוּת סוֹפֵר הוּא

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§ Shmuel said: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that one can collect a debt from liened property even if the promissory note does not include a property guarantee? They hold that omission of the property guarantee from the promissory note is a scribal error, as one would certainly not lend money without a property guarantee.

It is important to distinguish between scribal errors and scribal corrections. The Talmud was copied by professional scribes and students in a centuries-long process. One manuscript was copied from another (sometimes more than one), and mistakes, known as scribal errors, crept in during copying. Sometimes copyists read the text incorrectly, while on other occasions, they accidentally omitted entire words, phrases, and whole lines. Thus, one class of variants derives from scribal errors.

We explore some examples of textual transmission and the effort to prevent scribal errors.

Bava Metzia 13: כּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָר לַלֹּוֶה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מַלְוֶה עִמּוֹ

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Beginning with the Mishna on yesterday’s daf (12b), the focus in our perek is on what to do what you find a shetar – a legal document – which contains information about a transaction between two people. Since it is not clear who was holding the shetar when it was lost, it is unknown to whom it should be returned; perhaps, it cannot be returned to either of them.

For shelichut to work, it typically requires a DIRECT appointment by the ba'al davar, the person who will dispatch the shaliach and who will absorb the halakhic consequences of the action performed. However, several gemarot assert the ability to represent another person without direct appointment. If the given activity is overwhelmingly beneficial, a “zekhut,” it can be performed by an agent who has not been explicitly appointed. This ability is known as “zachin le-adam shelo be-fanav.” The Rishonim differ as to the relationship between classic shelichut and zachin, and this debate affects to the nature of shelichut itself.

We explore the notion of “zachin le-adam shelo be-fanav.” Where it applies especially regarding the sale of chametz on Pesach.

A Shtar may be written for a borrower even without the presence of the lender; nonetheless if the lender protests not to write the Shtar for the borrower we do not write the Shtar against his will.

However a Shtar may not be written for the lender if the borrower is not present. (Shulchan Aruch CM 39:13)

Bava Metzia 12: וְכִי מוּתָּר לָאָדָם לְהַרְבִּיץ אֲרִי בְּתוֹךְ שָׂדֵהוּ

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While the previous two Mishnayot dealt with how a person can claim an object by taking possession of it himself or by having his field take possession on his behalf, the Mishna on our daf discusses how a person can come to own something through the efforts of family members.

According to the Mishna, if an ownerless object is picked up by someone’s underage children, his non-Jewish slaves or his wife, it belongs to him. If, however, the children were adults, the slaves were Jewish or if he and his wife were in the midst of divorce proceedings, then the object would belong to the finder.

In the talmudic discussion Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Abaye: But how is it permitted for one to allow his son to follow him in the field, thereby causing all the poor people to leave? Is a person permitted to have a lion crouch in his field so that the poor people will see it and flee?

Which brought to mind Rembrandt’s Lion and his relationship with and influence on the Jews of Amsterdam and later Jewish painters which we explore.

Bava Metzia 11: שָׁכוּחַ מֵעִיקָּרוֹ הָוֵי שִׁכְחָה

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The Mishna on our daf, as well as the Mishna that preceded it (10a) focus on how a person might take possession of an object that he finds by taking hold of it himself or by claiming it as being on his property.

The case in our Mishna describes how a person who sees people running after an ownerless animal to claim it can say “my field has effected acquisition of the animal on my behalf” – assuming, of course, that the animal is on his property.

The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that in the case of an unsecured courtyard, if the owner is standing next to his field, yes, it effects acquisition of ownerless items on his behalf, but if he is not, it does not effect acquisition of items on his behalf?

As it is taught in a baraita: There is a case where a landowner was standing in the town and saying: I know that my laborers forgot a sheaf that I have in the field, which I had intended for the laborers to bring in, but since I remember it, it shall not be considered a forgotten sheaf, which must be left for the poor. Then, the landowner himself forgot about the sheaf. In this case, one might have thought that it is not considered a forgotten sheaf. To counter this, the verse states:

“When you reap your harvest in your field, and have forgotten a sheaf in the field, you shall not go back to fetch it; it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow” (Deuteronomy 24:19). It is derived from here that the phrase: “And have forgotten”applies “in the field,” but not in the town.

We explore memory and forgetting with respect to trauma and cultural violence.

Bava Metzia 10: אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל אָדָם קוֹנוֹת לוֹ

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One of the themes that is discussed on our daf is “Ein shali’ah le-dvar aveira – a person cannot be made an agent to sin” – i.e. that a person must take responsibility for his own actions, and cannot blame another person for having told him to perform a forbidden act.

According to the Gemara in Massekhet Kiddushin (42b) the underlying principle of ein shali’ah le-dvar aveira is based on the fact that the messenger’s true obligation is to follow the directions of God, not of another person – divrei ha-rav ve-divrei ha-talmid, divrei me shom’im!

We explore the science of coercion and the famous Milgrom experiments.

Bava Metzia 9: הָכִי נָמֵי דְּחָצֵר מְהַלֶּכֶת הִיא

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Our Daf turns us toward the question of what is included in one's acquisition. If a person pulls an animal, does s/he acquire the vessels that are sitting on that animal?

Would a person who wanted the vessels but not the animal acquire those vessels by pulling the animal? Is the animal like a 'mobile courtyard' in this case, and thus what is left in the courtyard is acquired by its owner?

Acquire the animal and acquire the vessels, does the buyer acquire the vessels? Although one can acquire an item by having it placed in his courtyard, and one’s animal is the equivalent of his courtyard, it is considered a mobile courtyard, and a mobile courtyard does not effect acquisition of items that are placed in it.

And if you would say that the animal can function as a courtyard when it is standing still, not walking, while being pulled, isn’t there a principle which states that anything that does not effect acquisition when moving also does not effect acquisition when it is standing or sitting?

Several gemarot establish the principle of kinyan chatzer. Though personal possession entails the most basic form of ownership, the gemara recognizes the capacity of 'chatzer' to almost mimic physical possession.

We explore the Halacha of parking lots, driving and parking on Shabbat and the various approaches.

Bava Matzia 8: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ

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Aside from the cases described in the first Mishna (2a) where two people were both holding a cloak and claiming ownership, the Mishna also describes other situations in which ownership claims are made. If two people are riding an animal, for example, or if one was riding and one was leading the animal, the Mishna rules that we will treat their claims of ownership the same way we treat people who are each holding an object.

As we use oath taking to settle financial disputes like these we explore the legal system used by Jews in 18th century Amsterdam.

Bava Metzia 7: שְׁנַיִם אֲדוּקִין בִּשְׁטָר

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Up until this point in the discussion of how to rule when two people are both holding – and claiming ownership of – a single object, we have been dealing with things that can theoretically be divided between the two parties. Our Gemara brings a baraita that discusses a case where two people are holding onto a shetar – a legal document (in this case a promissory note) – where the lender claims that it is his and he had dropped the note and the borrower agrees that it had once been the lender’s but that now he had paid the debt and it belonged to him. The baraita quotes a disagreement in this case, with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruling that the shetar should be examined by the courts to see if it is reliable and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel arguing that the two people should divide the sum of money that is in doubt.

We explore the history and Tisha B’Av Kinna surrounding the burning of the Talmud in Paris 1240 penned by Reb Meir of Rotenburg.

Bava Metzia 6: שָׁלֹשׁ שָׁבוּעוֹת מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתוֹ

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Rav Sheshet says: The judges administer three oaths to an unpaid bailee who claims that the deposit with which he was entrusted was stolen: I hereby take an oath that I was not negligent in safeguarding it; I hereby take an oath that I did not misappropriate the deposit; and I hereby take an oath that it is no longer in my possession, there is the same difficulty. Since the court raises these suspicions against the bailee, let us say that since he is suspected of financial dishonesty, he is suspected with regard to taking an oath.

We explore the use of oaths in antiquity, specifically Ancient Greece.

Bava Metzia 5: שְׁבוּעָה זוֹ לָמָּה

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As we have learned, when someone claims that another person owes him money and the defendant denies that he owes all of the money, but admits that he owes part of it, then he is a modeh be-miktzat who must pay the amount that he admits to and then take an oath that he does not owe any more. The Gemara (daf 3a) brings the opinion of Rabbi Hiyya who rules that the same law would apply if the defendant denied owing any money but witnesses come and testify that he owes part of the money that is claimed. Here, too, according to Rabbi Hiyya, the defendant will have to swear that he does not owe the full amount, since the witnesses are no less believable than his own admission.

In Jewish law, oaths are not taken in court by witnesses, but by the defendant who, under certain circumstances, is obligated to either pay or satisfy the plaintiff by swearing that he does not owe money. The halakha is that if the defendant “owes” the plaintiff an oath, but he cannot take it for some reason (e.g. he is known to be untrustworthy), then the plaintiff would be permitted to swear that his claim is true, and the defendant will have to pay.

We explore the performative speech act inJewish Law with the analysis of Amir Mashiach.

Bava Metzia 4: פִּיו יוֹכיִח

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Rebbi Chiya teaches that one is obligated to swear when witnesses testify that he owes half of the amount of money that his opponent claims. The Gemara derives Rebbi Chiya's ruling from a Tzad ha'Shaveh from Hoda'as Piv and Ed Echad. The Gemara asks that Rebbi Chiya's ruling should not be derived from this Tzad ha'Shaveh, since neither Hoda'as Piv nor Ed Echad makes the defendant "Huchzak Kafran," whereas when two witnesses testify that he owes half of the claim he is "Huchzak Kafran."

The Gemara answers that even when two witnesses contradict his word regarding the loan (and he is a "Kofer b'Milveh"), he retains the status of a valid witness. Therefore, even when witnesses testify against him, he is not "Huchzak Kafran.”

We explore the limits of testimony and the struggle between modesty and the need for 3 men to witness the immersion of a convert.

Bava Metzia 3: שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא הוֹדָאַת פִּיו גְּדוֹלָה

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Our daf states that if the defendant denies a claim entirely, we believe him without requiring him to bring any further proof;

if he denies that he owes all of the money, but admits that he owes part of it, then he must pay the amount that he admits to and then take an oath that he does not owe any more.

Why do we trust the individual who denies it all, while making the person who admits that he owes some of the money take an oath?

This is the struggle of our sugya and we explore notions of Halacha vs metahalacha…with the help of Prof Moshe Halbertal.

Bava Metzia 2: וַאֲנָא יָדַעְנָא דְּכוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי

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Steinsaltz "Tractate Bava Metzia ( “The Middle Gate”) is actually one section of an ancient Talmudic tractate – Masechet Nezikin – which deals with issues of civil law, and was eventually divided into three parts (bavot, or “gates”).

As is true of the other sections, Masechet Bava Metzia focuses on one main topic, which divides into a large number of different issues, as is common in Talmudic discussions. The main topic of this tractate involves business interactions between people that are informed by Torah laws that define and limit them. Thus, the discussion does not cover all areas of business and possessions, rather it is limited to those areas where the Torah adds unique commandments or prohibitions beyond the normal laws that apply to business interactions.

Because of this, we find the laws of Masechet Bava Metzia codified not only in Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat (which deals with business relationships) but in Yoreh De’ah (whose focus is ritual law), as well. The topics covered include responsibilities towards lost and found objects, assisting in loading, and unloading animals, taking advantage of others in business, taking interest and usury, permitting a field worker to eat while working, the four types of shomrim (guards), the obligation to pay wages on time, among others.”

Bava Kamma 119: וּמָתָא מַחְסֵיָא – אַתְרָא דְּקָפְדִי הוּא

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As we complete the Masechta there appears to be no madras like most others, presumably because

The there Bava’s were one complete text….

So in memory of my father’s first yahrzeit I thought we might add some articles on midrasnhic theory.

Bava Kamma 118: וּמָנוּ אֶת הַצֹּאן וְהִיא שְׁלֵימָה

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The Mishna on our daf lists a number of cases where it is forbidden to purchase things because we fear that they may be stolen goods.

The Mishna rules, however, that in all cases where the purchaser is told to hide what he bought, it is forbidden to purchase, since it is likely stolen property.

The Gemara quotes a baraita that expands on these rules, explaining, for example, that already sewn woolen clothing can be purchased from shepherds, since we assume that it belongs to them. The general principle taught by the baraita is that anything that the shepherd sells that the owner would notice can be purchased.

We explore the ethics of using other people’s money.

Bava Kamma 117: יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁאֲנָסוּהוּ גּוֹיִם

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During Talmudic times, one of the most disturbing elements in the Jewish community was a moser – someone who collaborated with the foreign government, informing on his fellow Jews. Such a person was perceived as being dangerous to the well-being of the society at large. This led to a ruling by the Sages that a moser could be killed in order to protect the community.

The Gemara relates another incident pertaining to one who informed gentiles of the whereabouts of another Jew’s property. There was a certain individual who showed Rabbi Abba’s silk [ametakesa] to gentiles, who later seized it. Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa sat together to determine whether Rabbi Abba was entitled to compensation from the informer, and Rabbi Ile’a sat next to them.

The halacha is as follows: Someone who is Moser the money of his friend to a thief whether he was Moser it to a Jewish or a non-Jewish thief he is Chayav to pay from the best of his property everything that the thief took. Even though the Moser didn't pick it up and give it to the thief and only directed him to it he is Chayav. If he dies the money is collected from the inheritors of, he Moser just like other damages. (Shulchan Aruch CM 338:2)

We explore the world of the informant, from Petros Alphonse to Jacob Brafman.

Bava Kamma 116: יְיָרֵשׁ הַצְּלָצַל

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If someone stole a field from his friend, and bandits stole it from him, if these second bandits are plaguing the area (stealing many fields in the area), the first thief can say to the original owner, “Here is your field.” If it was because of the first thief (explained in the Gemora), the first thief must give the original owner another field.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak says: The one who calls these bandits “masikin” did not make a mistake, nor did the one who has the text “matzikin.” The text matzikin has its roots in the verse, “b’matzor u’bimatzok” (matzok meaning “with pain”). The text masikin has its source in the verse, “yi’yarash ha’tzlatzal,” which is translated as “the locust will take over” (see Tosfos who argues). The Mishna concluded that if it was because of the first thief etc.

The reference is to Deut 28:42:

We explore the world of Orthoptera specifically locusts and their use as Divine punishment the Chumash (comparing the two Tochacha’s) as well as in the book of Joel.