Gittin 65: גְּנִיבָא יוֹצֵא בְּקוֹלָר

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Our daf ends with the beginning of a new Mishna. These words tell us that a husband who requests a get be written for his wife should be indulged, regardless of the circumstance. He might have left with a caravan or he might be dangerously ill, says Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, but others should provide this service for him.

At first the Chachamim said that someone who is being taken out in chains and instructs witnesses to write a Get for his wife they shall write it and give it. Rashi says that he is being taken out to be killed; however the Yerushalmi states that even if he is taken out in chains for monetary obligation the Din applies.

The Chasam Sofer explains that Rashi also learns like the Yerushalmi that even if he is being taken out for monetary obligations the Din applies because a person who is being taken by the Malchus for monetary reasons is in mortal danger because once the Malchus gets a hold of a person for any reason they are liable to kill him.

Gittin 64: יְדָא יַתִּירְתָּא זַכִּי לַהּ רַחֲמָנָא

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According to Torah law, a father has the right to accept kiddushin on behalf of his daughter when she is a minor, and she will be married immediately. A na’ara is in a situation where either she or her father can accept kiddushin on her behalf. Once she passes that stage, she is an adult and her father can no longer act on her behalf with regard to marriage.

The Mishna on our daf teaches that in the case of a na’ara, both she and her father have the ability to accept a geṭ for her. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees, arguing that only the father has the ability to do so. All agree that a basic principle is that for a geṭ to work the woman receiving it must understand the significance of the geṭ and recognize the need to guard the document properly.

Gittin 63: שָׁאנֵי מָמוֹן, דְּאִיתְיְהִיב לִמְחִילָּה

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The Mishna on our daf discusses the case of a sheliaḥ leikabalah – a messenger appointed by a woman to accept a geṭ on her behalf. The Mishna teaches that in the event that the messenger reports that he received the geṭ, but he cannot produce it, the woman needs to produce witnesses both on the original establishment of the messenger and on the fact that the messenger received it and that it was destroyed. The Mishna concludes by noting that these do not need to be two separate sets of witnesses; the same people can attest to both parts of the divorce.

We explore the notion of Marriage, Infidelity, Divorce, and Reconciliation as Metaphor in the prophets…

Gittin 62: הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי

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The sixth perek of Massekhet Gittin, which begins on our daf, returns us to the issues of Jewish divorce law. Specifically, this perek focuses on sheliḥut – arranging for a messenger to play a role in the divorce.

There are two types of sheliḥut that are discussed regarding a geṭ:

Sheliḥut le-holakhah – a messenger established by the husband to deliver the geṭ. In this case the divorce will take effect when it reaches the wife’s hands and she takes possession of it.

Sheliḥut le-kabalah – a messenger established by the wife to accept the geṭ. In this case, the divorce will take effect the moment that the messenger accepts it on behalf of the wife.

One issue that concerns our Gemara is whether a woman can act as a shelihaḥ le-holakhah on behalf of a man or if a man could play the role of a sheliaḥ le-kabala for a woman.

Gittin 61: אֵין מְמַחִין בְּיַד עֲנִיֵּי גוֹיִם

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As we have seen, our perek has begun to deal with rabbinic enactments that were instituted to establish certain norms of behavior mipnei darkhei shalom – in order to keep the peace (see daf 59).

Several of these enactments deal with cases of possession and ownership. If a child picks something up, can it be taken from him? If a poor person drops fruit to the ground from a tree, can someone take it or does it belong to him? In cases like these, even though it appears that there is no real kinyan, mipnei darkhei shalom we view these things as having been claimed.

We explore those enactments that allow for impoverished non Jews to also benefit for the sake of peace.

Gittin 60: תּוֹרָה מְגִילָּה מְגִילָּה נִיתְּנָה

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Rabbi Elozar says: Much of the (laws of the) Torah is able to be derived from the verses within it, and a minority of it is not hinted at in the Torah but is transmitted orally. This is as the verse states: “I will write for him most of my Torah, like a stranger they will be.”

Rabbi Yochanan says most of it is transmitted orally while only a small amount is able to be derived. This is as the verse says, “For “al pi” -- “according” to these things.” [The word “pi” can also mean mouth, indicating that these words are mainly transmitted orally.]

Rabbi Yochanan said: Hashem only made a covenant with Bnei Yisroel because of the Oral Law, as the verse states, “Because due to these things I have made a covenant with you, Israel.”

We explore the tradition of menorah, the written oral law and their relationship as well as the struggle to make sense in the face of modern tools of scholarship.

Gittin 59: מִפְּנֵי דַּרְכֵי שָׁלוֹם

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Following a lengthy discussion of rabbinic enactments made mipnei tikkun ha-olam – to encourage the proper workings of society – our Mishna introduces a new set of similar enactments that were instituted to establish certain norms of behavior mipnei darkhei shalom – in order to keep the peace.

One example is the rule that a kohen will always be called to the Torah first, a levite second, and only afterwards will others be called. Several amora’im are quoted by the Gemara as noting that there are pesukim in the Torah that serve as sources for this rule. This leads Abaye to question why the Mishna refers to this rule as darkhei shalom when, in fact, it is a biblical law.

Gittin 58: הָיוּ דּוֹקְרִין אוֹתָן בְּחוֹטְרֵיהֶן

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Further to our agaric narratives of the Hurban we are told the following:

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: There was an incident involving the son and the daughter of Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha the High Priest, who were taken captive and sold into slavery to two different masters. After some time, the two masters met in a certain place. This master said: I have a male slave whose beauty is unmatched in all of the world, and that master said: I have a female slave whose beauty is unmatched in all of the world.

The horror of these stories is further explored in our review of the approach to agaddic narratives of catastrophe.

Gittin 57: ״וְהַיָּדַיִם יְדֵי עֵשָׂו״ – זוֹ מַלְכוּת הָרְשָׁעָה

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It was stated earlier that the city of Beitar was destroyed on account of a shaft from a carriage. The Gemara explains that it was customary in Beitar that when a boy was born, they would plant a cedar tree and when a girl was born, they would plant a cypress [tornita]. And when they would later marry each other, they would cut down these trees and construct a wedding canopy for them with their branches. One day the emperor’s daughter passed by there and the shaft of the carriage in which she was riding broke. Her attendants chopped down a cedar from among those trees and brought it to her.

Owing to the importance that they attached to their custom, the residents of Beitar came and fell upon them and beat them. The attendants came and said to the emperor: The Jews have rebelled against you. The emperor then came against them in war.

We continue our exploration of how our agaric legends formed the theology underlying the Hurban in our collective spiritual psyche compared with objective accounts from Josephus and Roman historians.

Gittin 56: תֵּן לִי יַבְנֶה וַחֲכָמֶיהָ

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On our daf, the Gemara describes how Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai managed to escape the city and negotiate with Vespasian, the Roman general in charge of the army surrounding Jerusalem. Rabban Yohanan offered words of welcome to him, referring to him as the king. Vespasian argued that Rabban Yohanan deserved death for calling him the king when someone else was sitting on the throne in Rome. Rabban Yohanan assured him that he had to be the king, since Jerusalem was destined to fall only into the hands of a king. In the course of their conversation a messenger arrived from Rome and informed Vespasian that he had been chosen to be ruler of Rome, an announcement that made Vespasian realize the truth of Rabban Yohanan’s statement. In appreciation he offered to respond favorably to any request that Rabban Yohanan would make. Rabban Yohanan asked that the city of Yavneh be spared together with its sages, a request that would pave the way for revived Jewish life even after the destruction of the Temple.

We explore the legend in our daf and in Josephus.

Gittin 55: לֹא הָיָה סִיקָרִיקוֹן בִּיהוּדָה בַּהֲרוּגֵי מִלְחָמָה

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One of the lengthiest collections of aggadata – of stories – that appears in the Gemara is the anthology of stories in our Gemara that discuss the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem. This begins on our daf with the famous story of Kamtza and bar Kamtza whose activities led to the eventual hurban – the destruction of Jerusalem.

We explore the story and its ramifications.

Gittin 54: אַזְכָּרוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ לֹא כְּתַבְתִּים לִשְׁמָן

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Our Daf discusses a person who tells Rabbi Ami that he wrote a Torah scroll without having the proper intention when writing G-d's name. The scroll was now in the hand sof the buyer. Rabbi Ami said that his wage should be forfeited but the Torah scroll is permitted.

The Gemara asks if he can't just rewrite those words with more ink while maintaining intention. This is not accepted by the rabbis.

Even if it were possible to do so, they argue that the scroll would appear speckled, which is unacceptable.

We review the halachot of scribal errors and the history of Mashes Soferim.

Gittin 53: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה – אֶחָד שׁוֹגֵג, וְאֶחָד מֵזִיד

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The first two sections of this mishnah deal with certain responsibilities that guardians have in taking care of orphans. The final section deals with damages that are done to food or sacrifices that cannot be seen.

Our new Mishnah states: With regard to one who renders another’s food ritually impure, or one who mixesteruma with another’s non-sacred produce, or one who pours another’s wine as a libation before an idol, in each of these cases causing the other a monetary loss, if he acted unintentionally, he is exempt from paying for the damage. If he acted intentionally, he is liable to pay.

There are three types of invisible damage mentioned in this first clause. If one causes someone else’s terumah to become impure, it has to be thrown away. If someone mixes in terumah with another person’s normal produce it must be sold to priests at the price of terumah which is lower than the price of normal produce. Finally, if someone makes an idolatrous libation with someone else’s wine, the wine must be thrown away. Similarly, if one mixes already libated wine with non-libated wine it must all be thrown away. In all of these cases the damage is done but the object has not physically changed at all. The bottom line halakhah holds that damage that cannot be seen is not considered damage.

We explore the notion of culpability for invisible damages and fraud.

Gittin 52: אַחְווֹ לֵיהּ בְּחֶלְמֵיהּ ״אֲנִי לַהֲרוֹס וְאַתָּה לִבְנוֹת

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It is related that there was a certain steward who was in Rabbi Meir’s neighborhood who was selling land belonging to the orphans and purchasing slaves with the proceeds, and Rabbi Meir did not allow him to do this, as the practice is contrary to halakha. They showed him in his dream the words: I wish to destroy and you build? He understood this as a sign that God wanted the orphans to suffer financial collapse, and therefore it would be preferable to allow the steward to continue his practice. Even so, Rabbi Meir paid no heed to his dream, and said: Words appearing in dreams do not bring up and do not take down; they should not be taken into consideration.

The Talmud contains many theories about the content of dreams. In Berachot (10b) Rabbi Hanan taught that even if a dream appears to predict one's imminent death, the one who dreamed should pray for mercy. R. Hanan believed that dreams may contain a glimpse of the future, but that prayer is powerful enough to changes one's fate.

Later in Berachot (55b), R. Yohanan suggests adifferent response to a distressing dream: let the dreamer find three people who will suggest that in fact the dream was a good one (a suggestion that is codified in שולחן ערוך יורה דעה 220:1).

In contrast, Rabbi Yonatan suggests that dreams do not predict the future: rather they reflect the subconscious (Freud would have been proud). "R. Yonatan said: a person is only shown in his dreams what he is thinking about in his heart..." (Berachot 55b).

And from our daf , we learn that Rabbi Meir believed dreams were of no consequence whatsoever.

Gittin 51: אֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל טַעֲנַת חֵרֵשׁ

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The Gemara asks: Does the claim of a minor have any substance? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): One does not take an oath in response to the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, as the claim of one who lacks halakhic competence has no significance whatsoever. According to this, if a minor brought a claim against the borrower, it is as though there were no claim at all but only the borrower’s admission, and so the borrower should be exempt from taking an oath.

In further exploration of minors we look at the notion of the visiting of the sins of the fathers on the sons.

Gittin 50: שְׁטַר חוֹב הַיּוֹצֵא עַל הַיְּתוֹמִין

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A guarantor of the Ketubah obligation is not obligated to pay - he is just encouraging the couple to marry.

A creditor collecting from the deceased father's estate is entitled to the

worst land only. If orphans are minors, they are protected by not having to deal with selling the worst land. If adults, they do not know the affairs of their father, so an oath that the debt was not paid is required.

Creditors collecting from the estate first collect from available property, and only then proceed to repossess from purchasers those fields on which there is a prior lien.

We explore the status of orphans in antiquity.

Gittin 49: הָאִשָּׁה רוֹצָה לִינָּשֵׂא

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Payment of a woman’s marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: It can be collected from intermediate-quality land. Rabbi Shimon said: For what reason did the Sages say that a woman’s marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land? It is because more than a man wants to marry a woman, a woman wants to become married to a man.

Consequently, she will agree to marry even if she knows that she will not be able to collect payment of the marriage contract from superior-quality land.

We explore the nature of this difference in attitudes to marriage, and recent sociological studies that suggest differing structural reasons.

Gittin 48: בְּעִידִּית or בְּזִיבּוּרִית

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The fifth perek of Massekhet Gittin – perek ha-nizakin – begins on our daf. There are no discussions of divorce law in this perek;

it is a continuation of the previous perek which dealt with cases of rabbinic enactments established mipnei tikkun ha-olam.

The first Mishnah states: The court appraises land of superior quality [iddit] for payment to injured parties. And a creditor collects his debt from the debtor’s intermediate-quality land.

And payment of a woman’s marriage contract is collected from her husband’s inferior-quality land.

Rabbi Meir says: Payment of a woman’s marriage contract is also collected from intermediate-quality land.

The Gemora asks: Is this halachah (that we collect from the damager’s superior quality land) only an ordinance to benefit the public?

It is a Biblical law, as it is written: The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay!?

We explore the Talmud’s Economic Behavior, and the Study of Behavioral Economics.

Gittin 47: זַבֵּין נַפְשֵׁיהּ לְלוּדָאֵי

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If a person has been taken captive and is at risk of dying, s/he must be redeemed. The rabbis walk us through a number of circumstances where we might make this conditional.

Our Daf speaks of Reish Lakish who sold himself as a gladiator. He brought a rock in a bag with him. His captors asked him for his last wish, and he asked to hit them each one and a half times with the rock. They complied. The first captor was killed at once, but Reish Lakish pretended to converse with him so that the others would not flee. After Reish Lakish retired home, his daughter offered him a pillow to sleep on. Reish Lakish said that his stomach was his pillow. We learn later that Reish Lakish wished to leave this life with nothing, and he lamented that he still owned a kav of saffron when he died.

We explore negotiating with terrorists and the recent halachic arguments in and out of Israel by poskim.

Gittin 46: שֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל פְּרוּצוֹת

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It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 3:4) Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: For what reason did they say that a man who divorces his wife due to her bad reputation may not remarry her, and one who divorces his wife due to a vow may not remarry her? So that Jewish women will not be licentious with regard to forbidden sexual relations or lax with regard to vows.

(The reason for this halacha is as follows: According to one opinion, it is possible that after the woman had obtained from a Chacham the disallowance of her vow and had married another man, her first husband might regret his action in divorcing her and he might claim that he would not have divorced her had he known that her vow could be disallowed. Consequently, this might impair the validity of her second marriage. By the enactment that “he may not remarry her,” a husband is naturally induced to institute all the necessary enquiries and to consider very carefully his course before he decides upon divorce, and should he nevertheless divorce her and then claim that he was unaware that her vow could be disallowed, his plea might well be disregarded. According to another opinion, the prohibition to marry a woman in the circumstances mentioned is a penalty, and a warning to women to abstain from making vows.)

We review Approaches to the Representations of Women in Rabbinic Literature from various scholars.