

Daf Ditty Pesachim 6: אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה

*What we call the beginning is often the end
And to make an end is to make a beginning.
The end is where we start from. . . .
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.*

T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding," (V)

שלשים יום

שואלין ודורשין בהלכות הפסח
קודם הפסח שלשים יום
שהרי משה עומד בפסח ראשון
ומזהיר על הפסח שני

ר' שמעון בן גמליאל אומר
שתי שבתות

תורה אור

שהרי משה עומד בפסח ראשון ומוהיר על
הפסח שני שנאמר *ויעשו בני ישראל את
הפסח במועדו וכתוב ויהי אנשים אשר
היו ממאים לנפש אדם ור' שמעון בן גמליאל
אמר לך איירי דאיירי במילי דפסחא מסיק
ולדו לכל מילי דפסחא מאי טעמא דרשב"ג
שהרי משה עומד בראש החדש ומוהיר על
הפסח שנאמר °החדש הזה לכם ראש
חדשים וכתוב דברו אל כל עדת ישראל
לאמר בעשור לחדש הזה ויקחו להם איש
שה לבית אבות וגו' ממאי דבריי' ירחא
קאי דילמא בארבעה בירחא או בחמשה
בירחא קאי אלא אמר רבה בר שמי משמיה
דרבינא מהכא °וידבר י"י אל משה במדבר סיני
בשנה השנית בחדש הראשון וכתוב
°ויעשו בני ישראל את הפסח במועדו הכא
נמי ממאי דברוש ירחא קאי דילמא בארבעה
בירחא או בחמשה בירחא קאי אמר רב
נתמן בר יצחק אחיא מדבר במדבר כתיב
הכא במדבר סיני וכתוב ההם °וידבר י"י
אל משה במדבר סיני באהל מועד באחד
לחדש השני מה להלן בראש חדש אף
כאן בראש חדש וניכתוב כרישא דחדש
ראשון והדר ניכתוב דחדש שני אמר רב
בנשיא בר תחליפא משמיה דרב °וזאת
אמרת אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה אמר רב

הַיְנִי שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, מֵאֵי עֲבִידְתֵיהוּ? כְּדֵתְנָא: שׁוֹאֲלִין וְדוֹרְשִׁין בְּהִלְכוֹת הַפֶּסַח
קוֹדֵם הַפֶּסַח שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. רַבֵּן שְׁמַעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: שְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת. מֵאֵי
טַעְמָא דִּתְנָא קָמָא —

The Gemara asks: **What is the purpose of this period of thirty days** that renders it significant?
The Gemara answers: **As it was taught in a baraita: One asks about and teaches the halakhot
of Passover thirty days before Passover. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One begins**

studying those *halakhot* **two weeks** before the Festival. The Gemara asks: **What is the reason for the opinion of the first *tanna***, that one begins studying the *halakhot* of Passover thirty days before the Festival?

שְׁהָרִי מִשָּׁה עוֹמֵד בְּפֶסַח רִאשׁוֹן, וּמִזְהִיר עַל הַפֶּסַח שֵׁנִי, שְׁנֵי אַמָּר: "וַיַּעֲשֶׂה
בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת הַפֶּסַח בְּמוֹעֵדוֹ", וּכְתִיב: "וַיְהִי אֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר הָיוּ טְמֵאִים
לְנֶפֶשׁ אָדָם".

The Gemara explains that this *halakha* is derived from the fact that **Moses was standing** at the time of the **first *Pesah***, on the fourteenth of Nisan, **and warning** the people **about** the *halakhot* of **the second *Pesah***, which occurred a month later, on the fourteenth of Iyar. **As it is stated** that God said to Moses: **“Let the children of Israel perform the *Pesah* at its appointed time”** (Numbers 9:2). A subsequent verse says: “And Moses told the children of Israel to perform the *Pesah*, and they performed the *Pesah* in the first month on the fourteenth of the month in the evening, in the desert of Sinai” (Numbers 9:4–5). **And it is written** in the next verse: **“And there were people who were impure due to a dead body** and could not perform the Passover on that day, and they came before Moses and before Aaron on that day” (Numbers 9:6), at which point Moses explained the *halakhot* of the second *Pesah* to them. This proves that one begins studying the *halakhot* of the Festival thirty days beforehand.

וְרַבֵּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אָמַר לָךְ: אֵיִדִי דְאִירִי בְּמִילֵי דְפֶסַחָא, מִסִּיק לְהוּ
לְכָל מִילֵי דְפֶסַחָא.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel could have **said to you** in rejecting that proof: **Since Moses was speaking with regard to the laws of Passover, he completed teaching all the matters of Passover**, including those of the second *Pesah*. Consequently, one cannot derive a principle from this case.

מאי טעמא דרבן שמעון בן גמליאל? שהרי משה עומד בראש החדש, ומזהיר על הפסח, שנאמר: "החדש הזה לכם ראש חדשים", וכתיב: "דברו אל כל עדת ישראל לאמר בעשר לחדש הזה ויקחו להם איש ששה לבית אבות וגו'".

The Gemara asks: **What is the reason for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's ruling?** He explains that **Moses was standing on the first day of Nisan and warning about the performance of the first Pesah, as it is stated: "This month shall be for you the beginning of the months, the first of the months of the year" (Exodus 12:2). And it is written in the next verse: "Speak to the entire congregation of Israel, saying: On the tenth day of this month they shall take for them every man a lamb, according to their fathers' houses, a lamb for each household" (Exodus 12:3).** The Torah proceeds to detail the *halakhot* of the Paschal lamb sacrificed on the fourteenth day of that month.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק: אתיא "מדבר" מ"מדבר". כתיב הכא: "במדבר סיני", וכתיב התם: "וידבר ה' אל משה במדבר סיני באהל מועד באחד לחדש השני". מה להלן בראש חודש — אף כאן בראש חודש.

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: The *halakha* is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term wilderness written here and the term wilderness written previously. **It is written here: "In the wilderness of Sinai," and it is written there: "And God spoke to Moses in the wilderness of Sinai in the Tent of Meeting on the first of the second month" (Numbers 1:1).** **Just as there it occurred on the day of the New Moon, on the first of the month, so too here, with regard to Passover, it was on the day of the New Moon.**



- שהרי משה עומד בראש החדש ומזהיר על הפסח -
 since Moshe taught the הלכות of פסח on ניסן on קרבן פסח.
 From the Posuk that serves as a source for רש"י's opinion we
 also learn
 - אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה -
 The Torah is not necessarily written in chronological order.
 רב פפא adds that holds true only
 - בתרי ענייני -
 Rashi says; בשתי פרשיות - which is understood as either two
 paragraphs or two topics.
 - אבל בחד עניינא ומאי דמוקדם מוקדם ומאי דמאוחר מאוחר -
 But within one ענין the תורה is written in order.
 Otherwise we would never know when to view something as
 a general statement followed by a specific
 statement, or a פרט וכלל - a specific statement followed by a
 general statement.

וְנִיכְתוּב בְּרִישָׁא דְּחֻדְשׁ רֵאשׁוֹן, וְהֵדֵר נִיכְתוּב דְּחֻדְשׁ שֵׁנִי. אָמַר רַב מְנַשֵּׁיָא
 בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא מְשַׁמִּיָּה דְּרַב: זֹאת אֲמַרְתָּ אֵין מוֹקְדָם וּמְאוּחָר בַּתּוֹרָה.

The Gemara asks: If so, **let the Torah write first** that which occurred **in the first month and then let it write** that which occurred **in the second month**, as the portion of the Paschal lamb preceded the beginning of the book of Numbers chronologically. **Rav Menashiya bar Tahlfifa said in the name of Rav: That is to say that there is no earlier and later**, i.e., there is no absolute chronological order, **in the Torah**, as events that occurred later in time can appear earlier in the Torah.

אָמַר רַב פּאָפּא: לָא אָמְרוּן אֶלָּא בְּתַרֵי עֲנִינֵי, אָבֵל בְּחַד עֲנִינָא, מֵאֵי דְמוֹקְדָם
— מוֹקְדָם, וּמֵאֵי דְמֵאוּחָר — מְאוּחָר. דְּאֵי לָא תִימָא הָכִי, "כִּלְל וּפְרָט —
אֵין בְּכִלְל אֶלָּא מֵה שְׁבַפְרָט", דִּילְמָא פְרָט וּכְלָל הוּא!

Rav Pappa said: This principle **applies only** when the Torah deals **with two separate matters, but within one matter, that which** is written **earlier** occurred **earlier, and that which** is written **later** occurred **later; as, if you do not say so** but you claim that there is no definite order within each matter, then the hermeneutic principle: When a **generalization** is followed by a **detail the generalization** refers **only to that which** is specified in **the detail**, is problematic. This principle is valid only if there is a definite order to the verses and words in each matter. If there is no definite order, **perhaps** it is actually a **detail** followed by a **generalization**, which is interpreted by means of an alternate hermeneutic principle with different results.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:¹

Moshe stood on Rosh Chodesh and instructed the Jews regarding the Pesach offering that was to be brought two weeks later on the fourteenth of Nissan. The significance of thirty days before Pesach is based on a braisa that states: *We ask and expound on the laws of Pesach thirty days prior to Pesach, so that we will be familiar with the laws.* Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that it is sufficient to ask and expound on the laws of Pesach two weeks before Pesach.

The Tanna Kamma maintains that Moshe stood on the day when the first Pesach offering was brought, which was the fourteenth of Nissan, and he instructed the Jewish People regarding the laws of the Pesach Sheini which was brought on the fourteenth of Iyar. Moshe instructed them thirty days prior to the offering of Pesach Sheini. From the fact that Moshe explained the laws of Pesach Sheini then, we can infer that the laws pertaining to the upcoming holiday should be taught thirty days in advance. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that Moshe stood on Rosh Chodesh, the first of Nissan, and instructed the Jewish People regarding the Pesach offering that they would bring two weeks later, on the fourteenth day of Nissan. Alternatively, we can derive the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel from the verse that states that Hashem spoke to Moshe in the Wilderness of Sinai in the first year in the first month, on the first day of the month, and Hashem told Moshe to tell the Jewish People to make the Pesach offering in its proper time which was two weeks later.

The Torah is not written in chronological order.

The Torah records the incident regarding Pesach Sheini, which occurred in the wilderness in the second year in the first month, after the Torah records the census of the Jews in the beginning of the Book of Num, and the census occurred in the second year in the second month. We derive from this that the Torah is not written in chronological order.

¹ http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Pesachim_6.pdf

This idea was only said concerning verses in two passages, but regarding verses that were recorded in one passage, whatever was recorded earlier occurred earlier, and that was recorded later occurred later.

The proof for this is from a *klal uprat* and from a *perat uklal*.² When there is a generalization and then a specification, we say the generalization only contains within it the specification. If there is no order in the Torah even in one passage, then perhaps it is really a specification and generalization. Similarly, with regard to a specification and a generalization, when the generalization functions as an addition to the specification, if there is no order in the Torah even in one passage, then perhaps it is really a generalization and a specification. Therefore, we must say that the verses in a single passage in the Torah were written in chronological order.

The expression was first used in the Baraita on the Thirty-two Rules, which is traditionally attributed to Eliezer ben Jose (a 2nd-century tanna). However, according to modern scholar Moshe Zucker, this work was in fact only written in the 10th century.³

The term first appears in the Mekhilta of Rabbi Ishmael, (Shira 7) and also in the Mekhilta of Rabbi Shimon, (Ch 15) Sifre on Numbers, (*Behaalotcha* 64) and the Jerusalem Talmud. (Megilla 7a).

The Babylonian Talmud proves that "There is no chronological order in the Torah" from the fact that Numbers 9:1 occurred on the first day of Nisan, while the earlier verse Numbers 1:1 occurred on the first day of Iyyar, a month later. In the ensuing discussion, Rav Pappa limits the application of the rule to cases of different matter, but within a single topic he says the Torah's narrative must be chronological.^[7] Later commentators disagree over the definition of a "matter": Rashi defines it as a parashah, while Rabbeinu Hananel defines it as a single topic of discussion.

The first Bible commentator to use the term was Rashi, who used it frequently, as did Ibn Ezra and the Torah Temimah. In contrast, Nachmanides argued that the Torah's order is generally chronological. Raavan argued that the principle only applies in the Torah, and not in the Nevi'im or Ketuvim.

The Torah is not written in chronological order⁴

Our Daf states that the Torah is not written in chronological order. Although the Ways of Hashem are concealed from us, Rabbeinu Bachye offers us a glimpse into the wonders of Hashem. Rabbeinu Bachye in his *Introduction to commentary on Chumash* cites a Medrash Tehillim (3) that states that if the Torah had been written in its proper order, then a person would have the ability to resurrect the dead and perform other miracles.

Rabbeinu Bachye adds that now that the Torah was not written in chronological order, a person merits through the study of Torah a share in the World to Come. Moshe Rabbeinu acquired all his

² These terms mean a generalization (klal) and then a specification (perat), and a specification and then a generalization.

³ "LePitaron Baayat 32 Middot uMishnat R' Eliezer", PAAJR 23 (1954), p. 1-39

⁴ <https://dafdigest.org/masechtos/Pesachim%20006.pdf>

knowledge and insight from the Torah, and Shlomo HaMelech, who is referred to as the smartest man that ever lived, also acquired his vast amount of knowledge from the Torah.

There is no chronological order to the paragraphs in the Torah

אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה

Tosafos Rabeinu Peretz brings the Midrash Tanchuma (Teruma #8): Rabbi Yehuda ben Shalom said: There is no chronological order in the Torah, as we find in the verse (Mishlei 5:6): “Her courses wander, you cannot know.” This teaches that the paths and paragraphs of the Torah are not all in their place.

Hashem took the paragraphs of the Torah and moved them about in order that a person should not be able to take a small portion of the Torah and do with it whatever he wishes and create whatever he desires. The lesson is that if the Torah would be presented to us in its purest form, without any reformatting, it would be so potent that taking even a few words of its content would provide unlimited powers to anyone who would access it.

Tosafos Chachmei Anglia bring, in the name of the Yerushalmi, that another benefit of our knowing that the paragraphs of the Torah are not necessarily in the order we find them is in order to prevent the kohanim from becoming haughty in their being privileged to read first from the Torah. The order of the paragraphs might be jumbled, and the portion read by the kohen might not be an earlier portion at all, although it appears first.

The Rosh (*T’shuvos Klal 13 Siman 21*) extends this to all cases of people who are called to the Torah to read. A person who is called earlier than someone else should not think that his portion is better or more important just because he was called first. It might be, in fact, that his piece was said from Hashem later than the subsequent portion.

A Point of Order: The Principle of Ain Mukdam u’Meuchar baTorah.

Rabbi Immanuel Bernstein writes:⁵

Background: The Mishkan and the Chet Ha’egel

The final five parshiyos of Chumash Ex. are devoted, in the main, to matters relating to the Mishkan and the *bigdei kehunah* (priestly garments), with the notable exception of the *chet ha’egel* (sin of the Golden Calf), which features in the middle. The basic breakdown is as follows:

⁵ <https://outorah.org/p/64765/>

- **Parshas Terumah** – Hashem’s command regarding the Mishkan and its vessels.
- **Parshas Tetzaveh** – Hashem’s command regarding the bigdei kehunah
- **Parshas Ki Tisa** – The *chet ha’egel*.
- **Parshas Vayakhel** – The Torah’s description of the construction of the Mishkan.
- **Parshas Pekudei** – The Torah’s description of the manufacture of the *bigdei kehunah*.

Rashi[1] states that although the *chet ha’egel* is written in the Torah *after* the commands regarding Mishkan etc., it actually occurred beforehand. In stating this, Rashi is invoking the principle of אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה – There is no “earlier” or “later” in the Torah. In other words, the order in which events are *written* in the Torah does not necessarily reflect the order in which they *occurred historically*.

Where does this idea come from?

The Source: Counting Israel, the Korban Pesach – and Chumash Num

The idea that an event which happened earlier in history can be written later in the Torah is discussed in the Gemara,[2] based on a case where the Torah itself explicitly states that this was the case:

- The **opening chapter** of Chumash Num deals with the counting of the Bnei Yisrael, which the verse[3] describes as having happened in the **second month** of the second year.

- **Chapter nine** of Num discusses the korban Pesach that was offered in the Wilderness, specifying that this instruction was given in the **first month** of the second year![4]

The Gemara cites these two verses and concludes with the formulation: We see from here that there is no “earlier” and “later” in the Torah.

This principle is applied by Rashi several times throughout his commentary on the Torah,[5] with our situation being a classic example: Although the *chet ha’egel* is discussed in the “middle” parsha of Ki Tisa, it occurred *before* the events discussed in the prior parshiyos of Terumah and Tetzaveh.[6]

Understanding Rashi

Having seen the basis of the principle, we now proceed to ask: Why did Rashi invoke it *here*? In other words, Rashi must have had reason to conclude that the parshiyos of the Mishkan and the *chet ha’egel* are not in chronological order. What would that reason be?[7]

R’ Leib Heyman[8] offers a fascinating suggestion. Rashi notes that prior to the *chet ha’egel*, the *avodah* of korbanos was performed by the *bechorim* (firstborn), while the introduction of Kohanim from the tribe of Levi specifically to perform the *avodah* was a result of the *chet ha’egel*.[9] Having said this, we note that next week’s parsha, Tetzaveh, already records the command to initiate Aharon and his sons into the Avodah – an event which did not occur until after the *egel*! This says R’ Heyman, is what led Rashi to conclude that these parshiyos were not written in chronological order.

Understanding the Principle – General and Specific Approaches

Having discussed the circumstances which might lead us to invoke the principle of *אין מוקדם ומאוחר*, we come now to consider the principle itself: *Why*, if we may ask, does the Torah not always preserve the chronological sequence in its presentation of events? What is behind this idea?

It is possible to identify two different approaches to this question:

General Approach –

The Sefer Hachinuch, in his Introduction to Chumash Devarim, writes that in addition to teaching us how to perform mitzvos, the Torah includes and alludes to all forms of wisdom, which can be gleaned from it in many different ways. Moreover, says the Sefer Hachinuch, the inclusion of these other aspects of wisdom can sometimes result in the order of the parshiyos not paralleling the order in which the events occurred, since including those additional forms of wisdom contained within the Torah may take precedence over presenting the chronological order.

This is a profound and stunning idea.^[10] Moreover, we will appreciate that it is one that potentially explains all cases where we see *אין מוקדם ומאוחר* in action; whereby in all of those cases we can say that the Torah set aside the chronological order for purposes of teaching some additional point of wisdom which required a different order.

Specific Approach –

From Rashi, however, we can see that the answer to why a topic may have been presented out of chronological order will rest in a concern *relating to that topic itself*. Thus for example, while discussing the cases in Chumash Num which are presented out of order (Counting the people before korban Pesach), Rashi raises the question as to why in fact, Korban Pesach was not discussed first, and answers that it is because it reflects negatively on the Bnei Yisrael, since throughout all the forty years they were in the wilderness, they only offered this one korban Pesach.^[11]

As such, with regards to our situation, we ask: What is it *about the Mishkan and the Chet Ha'egel* which would lead to them not being discussed in the order in which they occurred?

Now, we could answer simply that it is similar to the Pesach case: We prefer to mention something positive, like the Mishkan, before something negative, like the Chet Ha'egel. However, it appears that there is a deeper point here.

Forget Me Not

The Gemara^[12] recounts a most unusual exchange between Hashem and the People of Israel:

Israel says: Seeing as there is no forgetting before You, perhaps You will not forget the episode with the egel?

Hashem responds I will [nevertheless] forget the Egel.

Israel the says: Seeing as You are prepared to forget the Egel, perhaps You will also forget the events of Sinai?

Hashem responds I will not forget Sinai.

What is the meaning of this exchange?

- How are the ideas of Hashem being prepared to forget the *egel* and potentially forgetting Sinai linked to each other?
- More specifically, what is the meaning of Hashem “forgetting” either of those events, seeing as Hashem is All-Knowing and does not forget anything?

The Maharal^[13] explains. The Jewish people were concerned that the fact that they could have erred with the *egel* so soon after having received the Torah was indicative of an essential disconnect between them and Hashem. If so, then Hashem would never forget the *egel*, for it would always represent something about their essential makeup. To this, Hashem responded that He *would* “forget” the *egel*, that is to say, He would not associate it with them in an essential manner, for it did not express their true nature. For in truth, the making the Egel was not the product of any such disconnect. Rather, it was a result of the vestiges of Egyptian culture to which they had been exposed for so many years, and from which they had only recently been removed.

At this stage, the concern of the Jewish people now becomes reversed. If their actions with the *egel* during this formative period were not necessarily an expression of their essential nature, perhaps their experiences at Sinai did not reflect their true essence either – and were thus likewise prone to being “forgotten” by Hashem! To this Hashem responds that he would not forget Sinai, as the level attained by Israel at that time really was an expression of their true nature.

Between History and Destiny

With the above in mind, we will appreciate that the order of events as presented by the Torah in these parshiyos can express one of two truths:

1. The truth about the order of events.
2. The truth about the Jewish people.

Now we can understand why the Torah reversed the order of events regarding the Mishkan and the *egel*. Had it presented them in the order they occurred, this may have been accurate regarding the events themselves but would have belied the truth about what they say about the Jewish people. To this end, the Mishkan is presented first, expressing thereby the *fundamental truth* that the Jewish people have an essential connection with the Divine Presence represented by the Mishkan, while they have no such connection with the prior episode of the *egel*. And while it may be true that those who don’t learn from history are destined to repeat it, those who *mis*-learn what history says about them risk compromising their destiny itself.

Notes

[1] Ex 31:18.

[2] Pesachim 6b.

[3] Num 1:1.

[4] Ibid. 9:1.

[5] Actually, in one respect, Rashi applies the principle even beyond the parameters set forth by the Gemara. The Gemara (Pesachim ibid.) states that the principle of *אין מוקדם ומאוחר* can only be invoked with respect to two sections of the Torah, but not within one

section. Rashi, however, does apply this principle even within one section (see e.g. Bereishis 18:3 s.v. *vayomar* and Ex. 4:20 s.v. *vayashav*). In this, Rashi seems to be more basing himself on the Yerushalmi (Shekalim 6:1) which invokes the principle of אין מוקדם ומאוחר with regards to the verse in our Parsha (25:21) that describes the placing of the *kapores* (covering) on the lid of the Aron before mentioning the placing of the *luchos* inside, even though the latter would happen beforehand. See also Tosafos Chullin 95b s.v. *ke'Eliezer*.

[6] This is in contrast to the Ramban, who understands that the order these events are written reflects the order in which they occurred:

1) Hashem initially commanded Moshe regarding the Mishkan and *bigdei kehunah* during the forty days he was on Mount Sinai (Terumah and Tetzaveh).

2) While Moshe was on the mountain, the people made the *egel*, at which point the project of constructing the Mishkan was “shelved” until the people had recovered from that sin (Ki Tisa).

3) Once Bnei Yisrael had received atonement for the *egel* (on Yom Kippur) Moshe was then able to tell them about the Mishkan, which they proceeded to build (Vayakhel and Pekudei).

This position reflects the Ramban’s approach generally regarding the principle of אין מוקדם ומאוחר, which he sets forth elsewhere in his commentary (Vayikra 8:2 and Num 16:1), and which is very restricted. According to the Ramban, this principle can only be invoked if *the Torah itself specifies* – either through date or location – that the later event happened earlier. In this regard, Rashi is more liberal in his understanding of the parameters which allow for applying this principle. Interestingly, the most frequent application of אין מוקדם ומאוחר is found in the commentary of the Ibn Ezra, see e.g. Bereishis 12:1 and Num 16:1.

[7] See Commentaries of Mizrahi and Gur Aryeh to Rashi loc. cit. who discuss this question.

[8] Chikrei Lev, Parshas Terumah

[9] See Rashi to Ex. 24:5 and Num 3:39.

[10] See similarly Responsa Radvaz sec. 1,086 and Shelah Hakadosh, Shavuot, Torah Ohr sec. 90.

[11] Rashi to Num 9:1.

[12] Berachos 32b.

[13] Ner Mitzvah.

The Presentation of Facts in the Narrative,

Prof. Yonatan Grossman writes:⁶

The last issue that we will examine is the organization of facts in the narrative. While there are additional ways in which the narrative alludes to hidden readings and to themes lying beneath the surface of the story, the sequence of the narrative and the method by which the scenes are integrated in it has a uniquely important contribution.

⁶ <https://www.etzion.org.il/en/presentation-facts-narrative-part-i>

The chronological continuity of the story is one of the building blocks of every narrative. Were the events in the narrative presented to the reader out of sequence (ignoring motivation and result, cause and effect, etc.), it would not be possible to follow the narrative at all. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to examine the order in which facts are related in the narrative. This issue is intimately connected to the issue of narrative structure, which we have already discussed, but we will focus on it independently because of its unique significance.

Every narrative is written according to a certain order, and the reader receives the facts according to a blueprint which serves the aim of the narrative. The reader is forced to encounter first things first, and only later does the reader encounter the latter fact. Consequently, the second fact is not neutral; the reader responds to it in light of what has already been revealed in the first detail. The statement, “I had cheesecake and ice cream for dessert, and I enjoyed every bite,” in and of itself, is innocent; the statement “I ate two steaks, and then I had cheesecake and ice cream for dessert, and I enjoyed every bite” is defiant, flouting the dietary traditions of Judaism. The meaning of the statement changes in light of its textual position and in light of its context.

For the most part, the order of facts conforms to the order of events that that narrative describes. Nevertheless, as we shall soon see, facts are often presented to the reader without accommodating the sequence of the plot. This should be viewed as a literary tool that contributes to the design of the story and its theme, and it has a real influence on the hidden reading of the narrative.

We will dedicate our current lecture to studying the view of the Sages of the Talmudic era and of the medieval commentators (through the words of R. Avraham Ibn Ezra) about this topic.

THE SAGES

The words of the Sages express a certain dilemma in the question of the narrative’s commitment to the order of events. The question of the significance of the proximity of passages to each other, *semikhut parshiyot*, is raised in **our daf** in connection with the dictum, “*There is no chronological order in the Torah*” (*ein mukdam u-meuchar ba-Torah*).

R. Menashya bar Tachlifa said in the name of Rav: This means that there is no chronological order in the Torah.

R. Pappa said: We only say this about two passages, but within one passage, there is chronological order. Were it not so, [the principle]^[1] “A generalization followed by a specification, the generalization does not include anything not in the specification” [would be meaningless] — perhaps it is a specification followed by a generalization? Additionally, [the principle] “A specification followed by a generalization, the generalization adds to the specification” — perhaps it is a generalization followed by a specification?

If this is true, even for two passages this should be true. This is consistent with the view that “If a generalization and a specification are distant from each other, we do not apply

the rules of generalization and specification’, but can one say this according to the view that do we apply the rules?

Even according to the view that we do apply the rules, this is true only within one passage, but between two passages, we do not apply them.

The dilemma cited in the passage is tied to the question of whether one can apply the rule of “There is no chronological order in the Torah” even within one passage – that is, one small literary unit.

Is the reader compelled to read the fact cited in the beginning of the story before the fact that follows it? Or is the order of writing perhaps merely an exigent element of encountering a written text? In that case, on an essential, thematic level, the facts may be reordered. According to R. Pappa, one may claim that full narratives do not appear in their natural location, but within the process of reading a given isolated unit, one may not claim that certain facts do not appear in an intentional sequence.

I am not convinced that R. Pappa actually believes that facts are never recorded out of their natural order in a given narrative, as it is obvious that there are in fact many examples of this throughout *Tanakh*. It appears to me that Rav Pappa does not deal with the historical-realistic level of the events described, but the interpretative-exegetical stratum. In other words, an exegete may not expound the verse except on the basis of its textual location, even if this is not the real place in which its events occur.

Evidence of this may be found in the fact that R. Pappa supports the limitation that he sets up to the rule that “There is no chronological order in the Torah” by citing the halakhic rules of hermeneutics: “A generalization followed by a specification” or “A specification followed by a generalization.” This indicates that his analysis is tied to the limitations of hermeneutical freedom.

The proposed division according to R. Pappa is an interesting one in terms of following the experience of the reader. This distinction authorizes the reader (or at least the exegete) to ignore the location of the entire story — what precedes and follows it - but the reader (or, as we have said, the exegete) must respond to the narrative continuity and the organization of the acts and the scenes according to their order in the text. In many ways, this distinction seems justified; the theme of a given story is not always tied to the story which appears before it (unless the text actively links them with a heading such as “After these things,” etc.). At the same time, the reader must respond to the experience of reading each individual story within the greater narrative continuity of the unit or book, as one encounters the facts in it.

Opposing R. Pappa’s view, we find that many Sages ask throughout Midrashic literature: “Why is this passage adjacent to that passage?” The basic assumption of this question is that there is significance to the arrangement of the passages and that the reading of one is influenced by its predecessor.^[2]

Thus, for example, according to R. Yishmael, the prohibition against priests drinking wine on duty appears immediately after the sin of Nadav and Avihu (*Vayikra* 10:1), interrupting the narrative continuity of the story of the eight day of consecration, in order to allude to the reader that the sin of Nadav and Avihu is tied to alcohol consumption. Similarly, the passage of the nazirite follows that of the suspected adulteress in order to allude to the reader that “anyone who sees a suspected adulteress in her disgrace will separate himself from wine” (*Berakhot* 63a, *Sota* 2a). The command of the priestly blessing is stated after the passage of the nazirite in order to teach that a priest who is about to bless may not drink wine, just like the nazirite (*Taanit* 26b). Many other examples abound. Even if it is difficult to see the simple meaning of the verse in these exegetical exercises, it is clear from them that the Sages recognize the value of the location of a specific passage; thus, its meaning is influenced by its concrete location in the textual continuum.

However, this view is also not accepted by everyone. This is how the Sifri (Num 131) presents the debate:

R. Akiva says: Any passage which is adjacent to another, learn from it.

Rabbi says: Many passages are adjacent to each other while being as far apart as the east is from the west.

In light of this argument, the Sifri analyzes four additional examples. According to Rabbi (Yehuda Ha-nasi), the very fact of juxtaposition of passages does not teach us anything about a connection between them in relation to their content.

In a certain sense, it sometimes appears that these two questions are tied to each other. If the order of the verses is chronological, the very fact of *semikhut* does not teach us anything. The narrative follows the continuity of events, and therefore it comes in this order specifically. However, if “There is no chronological order in the Torah” and the verse frees us from the chronological order of the occurrence of events, there is good reason to examine the reason that one passage appears next to another passage.^[3] One example of this is the formulation of the following *midrash* (*Berakhot* 10a):

A certain Sadducee said to R. Abbahu: It is written, “A psalm of David as he fled from Avshalom his son” (Tehillim 3:1) and “An ode of David as he fled from Shaul in the cave” (ibid. 57:1). Now, which came first? The incident with Shaul happened first!

He said to him: You do not derive from juxtaposition, so you have a problem. We, who do derive from juxtaposition, have no such problem, for R. Yochanan said: What is the biblical source for juxtaposition? For it says (ibid. 111:8), “They are joined for all eternity, they are done in truth and rightness.”

Why is the passage of Avshalom next to the passage of Gog and Magog? If one challenges you by saying that it is inconceivable that a slave would revolt against his master, you may say: Is it conceivable that a son would revolt against his father? If one occurred, the other may as well.

This Sadducee (the Munich manuscript has “sectarian”) asks R. Abbahu why *Tehillim 3*, which deals with David’s flight from Avshalom, appear before *Tehillim 57*, which deals with his flight from Shaul, as David’s flight from Shaul occurred many years before his flight from Avshalom’s rebellion. R. Abbahu responds that indeed, according to the Sadducees, who believe that one should not derive anything from textual juxtaposition, this is a good question, but since the rabbinical tradition is to derive from juxtaposition, it is appropriate to put *Tehillim 3* after *Tehillim 2*, which opens with “Why are the nations in a tumult?” (The Midrash, *ibid.* 7b and elsewhere, understands this as a reference to the war of Gog and Magog.)

It is clear according to this *midrash* that only in a place in which the passages are not arranged according to the chronological order of the events is there good reason to use the “Why is this passage adjacent?” device and to wonder about the textual continuity, into which additional ideological messages are woven.^[4]

Note that expounding the juxtaposition of passages arises in this dialogue as an argument between the Pharisees and Sadducees, showing that the Sages relate to this hermeneutical approach as one of the methods of expounding the Torah, and this has halakhic significance as well. This is important for our analysis because in halakhic passages, there is no “natural continuity” of the verse. Take the case of *egla arufa*, the heifer which has its neck broken in order to atone for an unsolved murder. This law appears in *Parashat Shofetim*, but it could have appeared in *Parashat Emor* or *Parashat Mishpatim* alongside the laws of murder there. Naturally, the question of whether there is any significance to the placement of the law of *egla arufa* amid the laws of war is a hermeneutical one. When, however, we turn to biblical narrative, where one expects chronological continuity, a variation from the natural order demands explication, and even on the simple level of understanding, one must justify this change.

MEDIEVAL COMMENTATORS: IBN EZRA

Beyond the debates in Midrashic literature about the importance of textual order and the reader’s fidelity to it, we find these dilemmas in the writings of the medieval commentators. As a (prominent) test case, we will demonstrate awareness of this phenomenon in the commentary of R. Avraham Ibn Ezra. It is worth noting that Ibn Ezra gives considerable weight to the question of the order of the passages; as Gottlieb notes in his book, ibn Ezra relates to these questions more than 150 times in his commentary.^[5]

When it comes to the location of full narratives, ibn Ezra normally frees a story from the chains of the textual continuum. For example, take the story of Moshe’s setting up his tent outside the camp (*Shemot 33:7-11*). This is mentioned in the verse after the description of the nation’s mourning as a result of the Sin of the Golden Calf and its punishment; it precedes the description of Moshe’s experience in the cleft of the rock and the renewal of the covenant between God and Israel. Ibn Ezra claims that this relocation of Moshe’s tent (called “the tent of meeting” — 33:7) actually occurred only after the giving of the second Tablets, although it is mentioned before it (*Peirush Ha-arokh*, ad loc.):

This was after he brought down the second inscribed Tablets and Israel started to make the Mishkan (Tabernacle). He took the name “the tent of meeting” for his own tent until the Mishkan was completed. There is no chronological order in the Torah.^[6]

This case is an object lesson of ibn Ezra’s commitment to emancipating passages from the chains of the textual continuum. Ibn Ezra does not even bring evidence that the narrative takes place in a different order from that which is written!^[7]

Usually, however, Ibn Ezra does explain the gap between the historical narrative and the textual narrative, and he even indicates the concept alluded to by this change in order. For example, according to ibn Ezra, the story of Yitro’s arrival at the Israelite camp ([Shemot 18](#)) is placed into the middle of the story of the Israelites’ journey to Mount Sinai; it does not appear in its proper place chronologically, because Yitro could only have arrived after the Giving of the Torah and the construction of the *Mishkan* (*Peirush Ha-arokh*, ad loc.):

The passage of “In the third month” (19:1) should have been written after the matter of Amalek (17:8-16), for there (19:2) it is written, “And they traveled from Refidim [where Amalek attacked], and they came to the Sinai Desert.” If so, why does the matter of Yitro come in between the two passages?

...But in my opinion, he did not come until the second year, after the Mishkan had been erected.

In the places in which jumps such as these occur, we should wonder what motivates Scripture to change the natural order. As we have said, often these points contain clues to hidden readings. Indeed, ibn Ezra (ibid.) tries to set out an explanation of the change of sequence in this situation as well:

Now I will explain why the passage of Yitro was inserted here: because we have mentioned above the evil done by Amalek to Israel, here we mention the contrasting good that Yitro did for Israel... And because it is written above (17:16), “God is at war with Amalek”, Israel must fight [Amalek] when God will grant them rest [from their other enemies]. So, he mentions the matter of Yitro here, because [his descendants] reside near the nation of Amalek; this will remind Israel of the kindness of the ancestor, and they will not touch his seed.

In Ibn Ezra’s view, there is a special value of placing the story of Yitro near the story of the Amalek War, something which contributes to drawing the reader’s attention to the contrast between them.^[8]

However, unlike the abovementioned view of R. Pappa, ibn Ezra argues that also in the continuum of the isolated unit, facts are given to the reader out of the proper sequence of the real events. For example, after the verse notes that Israel sees the manna which has fallen around the camp, Moshe’s explanation appears: “It is the bread which God has given you to eat” (16:15). Ibn Ezra (*Peirush Ha-arokh*, ad loc.) explains:

R. Moshe Ha-Kohen says: We already know that there is no chronological order in the Torah, as it says, “And Moshe said to them” — [meaning,] Moshe had already said to them. There are many other examples, even in this passage (v. 20): “And it bred worms and rotted” — [meaning,] it had already rotted. And so, it says (v. 24): “And it did not rot; nor was there any worm in it.”

Ibn Ezra does not content himself with the determination that the narrative is not organized in this case according to the order of the events; he seeks also to explain the aim of this change:

The verse delayed telling us the words of Moshe because it had to elaborate, saying (v. 20), “This is the thing which God has commanded.”

In other words, in his view, narrative convenience is the reason for citing all of Moshe’s words together.^[9] In this example, the change of sequence is tied to the technical exigencies of the verse. At other times, ibn Ezra sees the change as serving a narrative, values-based aim. So, for example, ibn Ezra explains the locations of *Parashat Behar* and *Parashat Bechukotai* (*Vayikra* 25:1):

*“On Mount Sinai” — there is no chronological order in the Torah, and this clearly precedes Parashat Vayikra and the ones which follow it, because the communication is upon Mount Sinai. This is when he makes the covenant which is written in Parashat Mishpatim (*Shemot* 24:7-8). It mentions it in this place to merge the criteria for the land; just as it says, concerning sexual immorality, that as a result of it the land will vomit them out (*Vayikra* 18:28, 20:22), so it speaks in Parashat Bechukotai (26:34, 43) about the land’s sabbatical years, and here it first mentions the details of these sabbatical years.*

Ibn Ezra deals with the difficulty which arises in even a simple reading of the passage. In light of the heading that opens this passage, it is clear that it was said while Moshe was on Mount Sinai, preceding the erection of the *Mishkan* and naturally before the Book of *Vayikra*, which opens (1:1) with God’s words to Moshe from the sanctuary of the *Mishkan*. According to the view of ibn Ezra, the blessing and curses in *Parashat Bechukotai* are part of the covenant described in *Shemot* 24, the “covenant of the bowls.” Why does the Torah push this passage until the end of the Book of *Vayikra*?

Here, ibn Ezra justifies the juxtaposition of the passage of the blessings and curses to the unit of holiness in the center of the Book of *Vayikra*, which describes how observing the prohibitions of sexual immorality is a condition of living in the Land of Israel. At this time, the verse is trying “to merge the criteria for the land” — that is to say, to note an additional condition for remaining in the land: observing the sabbatical and jubilee years. Since the blessings and the curses are appended to the laws of the sabbatical and jubilee years, and it clear from the language that the reward and punishment relate essentially to these commandments, there is a value to putting *Behar* and *Bechukotai* after the units of sexual morality in the Book of *Vayikra*.

Whether we adopt his view in these examples or not, it is clear that ibn Ezra displays great awareness of the importance of narrative sequence, the importance of the organization of facts

within the narrative and the possible contribution of this organization to the broader meaning of these stories.

Ibn Ezra's commentary is an example of deeper analyses done by the medieval commentaries — analyses which, for the most part, are tied to the question of the relationship between the natural (chronological) order of the narrative and the textual order as it appears before the reader. In modern critical analyses, commentators progress one further level, clarifying the contribution of the organization of facts in a narrative that apparently follows the actual events. We will deal with this phenomenon in our next lecture.

[1] **Translator's note:** Much hermeneutical halakhic analysis is based on the relationship of *kelal* (generalization) and *perat* (specification). Whether the *perat* is preceded by a *kelal*, followed by a *kelal*, or both will impact the scope of the given law.

[2] Y. Gottlieb, *Yesh Seder La-mikra* (Jerusalem and Ramat Gan, 5769), pp. 70-71, points out that term “*semikhut parshiot*” is not recorded before Rashi, and there are about twenty other expressions in the Sages' lexicon which express this concept: “It is written afterward;” “Why is this passage adjacent to that passage;” “A verse is expounded in light of its predecessor;” “The passage below will teach us about the above passage;” et al.

[3] Gottlieb in his abovementioned book cites the position of the Rosh, who formulates the diametrically opposed position: if there is no chronological order, there is no significance to the order of the verses at all, and the question “Why is this passage adjacent to that passage?” has no meaning (Gottlieb, pp. 4-5).

[4] Compare to Gottlieb (ibid.), pp. 40-42.

[5] Gottlieb, p. 169.

[6] Indeed, from his *Peirush Ha-arokh* to *Shemot 30:12*, it turns out that this passage is in its proper place.

[7] In the *Peirush Ha-katzar* (ad loc.), he does bring a reason for the change in order: “The passage is written in this place because of ‘And I will give you rest.’”

[8] Cassuto also adopts this reading, even expanding on the comparison of the two non-Jews under discussion (M. D. Cassuto, *Peirush Le-sefer Shemot*, ad loc.).

[9] Ibn Ezra does not always give a reason when he argues that a narrative or narrative elements do not appear in chronological order. See, for example, his commentary on the Tower of Bavel (*Shitta Acheret*, *Bereishit 10:25*).

Highlighting Juxtaposition in the Torah

The well-known rabbinic principle of אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה (there is no chronological order in the Torah) is often understood to be a hermeneutical solution to a textual, peshat problem. The principle, however, should be understood as midrashic, formulated to highlight other reasons for which biblical accounts could have been juxtaposed.

Dr. Isaac Gottlieb writes:⁷

⁷ <https://www.thetorah.com/author/isaac-gottlieb>



Introduction: The Catchall Answer

Whenever I confront students with a problem of chronology in a biblical text, one or more immediately call out, “אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה”! “There is no order in the Bible!” This popular phrase, whose literal translation is, “There is no earlier or later in the Pentateuch,” is first found in Mekhilta Shirata 7 referring to the order of verses in the Song at the Sea as well as in Sifre Bemidbar 64, which notes that chapter 9 carries the date “the first month of the second year” while Numbers chapter 1 records events that occurred “in the second month” of that year. This statement is later used in Talmud and Midrash and is popularly understood to be saying, “When it comes to chronology, anything goes.”

This is not so much an answer as a throwing up of the hands, which explains nothing. If indeed there is no chronology, what kinds of order and arrangement are found in the Bible? The principle

אין מוקדם ומאוחר suggests that while chronology is the most frequent criterion for the organization of Torah material, often we must search for other, non-chronological criteria that give meaning to the order or juxtaposition of texts in the Torah.

Our focus will be on Terumah, but we will open with the book of Exodus in general, in order to show how widespread the issue of order is.

The Placement of the Rules in Parashat Mishpatim

The story of the exodus from Egypt leads up to the sojourn in the Sinai desert, in which the stone tablets were given to Moses at Mount Sinai. The entire story from beginning until its climax in Parashat Yitro is presented in chronological fashion. But why is it followed by Mishpatim, a legal corpus that contains no hint of its date or provenance?

The rabbis understood that the juxtaposition of Mishpatim to Yitro was to let us know that just as the Ten Commandments were given at Sinai, so too were all the laws that followed.^[1] They derive this from Exod. 24:3, toward the conclusion of Parashat Mishpatim, where the Torah tells us that after his descent from the mountain, “Moses went and repeated to the people all the commands of the LORD and all the rules (ואת כל המשפטים),” which recalls the beginning of the legal collection, ואלה המשפטים, “These are the rules” (21:1).

The Torah thus surrounds the laws of Mishpatim with an inclusio that begins with Moses on the mountain (Exod. 19) and ends with Moses on the mountain (Exod. 24), to teach us that all the laws and commandments enclosed therein were given at Mount Sinai. It would seem that this rabbinic derasha that suggests that the two texts are related chronologically is based on the actual sense of the text.^[2]

The Placement of the Description of the Tabernacle

The placement of parashat Terumah in Exodus 25, immediately following Mishpatim, likewise calls for explanation. Like most of the remaining portions in Exodus it does not narrate a story; instead, it contains the blueprints and working plans for the construction of the Tabernacle (Mishkan) and its vessels.

The book of Leviticus, whose sacrificial rituals are centered on the Tent of Meeting (another name for the Tabernacle) might have seemed a more fitting location for these instructions. It seems, therefore, that the Torah wants to imply, as in the case of the laws in Mishpatim, that the plans and commandments for the construction of the Mishkan were also given to Moses at Sinai.

This is taught through the juxtaposition of Terumah to chapter 24, whose final verse is: “Moses went inside the cloud and ascended the mountain; and Moses remained on the mountain forty days and forty nights” (Exod. 24:18).^[3] In fact, Exod. 25:40 says explicitly, “Note well, and follow the patterns for them that are being shown you on the mountain,”^[4] implying even more directly that the blueprint for the Tabernacle was revealed during Moses’ forty-day stay at Sinai.

Reading the Juxtaposition as Not Chronological— The Midrashic Approach

Though the placement of the chapters from 21 on clearly implies that they were all—parashot Mishpatim, Terumah, and Tetzaveh — given at Sinai together, Rashi, based on Midrash Tanchuma, claims that the juxtaposition here is not chronological. Instead, Rashi claims, first the people sinned by making the golden calf (ch. 32), and only after repeated prayer and pleading by Moses,^[5] God forgave them. Only then was Moses told the details of the Sanctuary as they appear in Terumah, Tetzaveh and Ki Tissa (chapters 25-31).

In other words, even though the Golden Calf event (ch. 32) follows the instructions for how to build the mishkan (chs. 25-31), the events narrated there preceded the revelation of the Tabernacle

plans to Moses. In fact, Rashi argues, the plan to build the Tabernacle came about only after the sin of the Golden Calf in order that its construction and ritual should serve as atonement for that debacle.^[6]

All this may be seen in Rashi's comment on 31:18. The verse states:

וַיִּתֵּן אֶל מֹשֶׁה פְּכֻלְתּוֹ לְדַבֵּר אֵתוֹ בְּהַר סִינַי שְׁנֵי לַחַת הָעֵדוּת לַחַת אֶבֶן פְּתוּבִים בְּאֶצְבָּע אֵ-לֹהִים:

When He had finished speaking with him on Mount Sinai, He gave Moses the two tablets of the testimony, stone tablets, written with the finger of God.

וַיִּתֵּן אֶל מֹשֶׁה וּגו' – אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה. מעשה העגל קודם לצווי מלאכת המשכן ימים רבים היה....

“*He gave Moses*”: In the Torah, chronological order is not adhered to (in the Hebrew, *en mukdam u-meuhar ba-Torah*). The episode of the calf took place long before the command of the work of the Mishkan

The timeline suggested by Rashi, following the Tanchuma, was not offered to solve a textual difficulty. There is nothing problematic about the plans for the Mishkan preceding the Golden Calf incident. What the midrash and Rashi gain by changing the order of events is the idea that the construction of the Sanctuary was proposed only as an antidote to the sin of the Golden Calf. In other words, by using the phrase “There is no earlier or later in the Torah” they shuffle the order of events to suit this midrashic message.

Rashi notes that chapters 25 – 31 in Exodus were out of place, but he did not explicitly tell us why they are found in their current position. Perhaps he thought that their chronological order was intentionally ignored in order to include the rules of Mishpatim and the Tabernacle under the rubric of Sinai. When chronology is in order, which is most of the time, there is no pressing need for further explanation. The above two cases, Mishpatim and Terumah, teach that the message of juxtaposition is strongest when the chronological order is unclear or uncertain.

Conclusion: There is Chronology in the Torah

“There is no earlier or later in the Torah” is certainly not true for most of the Bible, not by a long shot. Quite the contrary, the Torah is ordered principally according to chronology; therefore, it is necessary to point out, as did Rashi, when chronology is being violated.^[7]

I have found that the expression “There is no earlier or later in the Torah” in rabbinic sources is rather infrequent, and most of the cases do not solve an explicit chronological problem, but use the principle to make a midrashic point, as Rashi did for the command to build the Sanctuary.^[8] So what “There is no earlier or later in the Torah” really means is, chronology is not the only form of order in the Bible. Juxtaposition often conceals meanings that are no less significant than the meanings explicit in the text itself.

1. Mekhilta of Rabbi Ishmael, Mishpatim, “Masechta De-Nezikin” 1
ואלה המשפטים. ר' ישמעאל אומר, אלו מוסיפין על העליונים, מה עליונים מסיני אף תחתונים מסיני.
2. It does not matter that, redaction critically speaking, one could claim that chapter 24 once immediately followed the account of the Sinai theophany, before the Covenant Collection in Mishpatim was added. Nevertheless, in its present arrangement, this chapter follows the legal collection in order to make the rabbinic point.
3. ויבא משה בתוך העגן ויעל אל־ההר ויהי משה בקהר ארבעים יום וארבעים לילה:
4. ויראה ויעשה בתבניתם אשר־אתה מראה בקהר:
5. The rabbinic view which Rashi adopts has Moses ascending and descending to beseech the Lord's forgiveness two times, 40 days each, during the months of Tammuz, Av, and Elul, in addition to the first ascent to receive the Torah in Sivan.
6. According to this explanation, the plans for the Mishkan were revealed to Moses on the mountain but only upon his third ascent beginning on the first of Elul and culminating on Yom Kippur.
7. ויתן אל משה וגו' – אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה. מעשה העגל קודם לצווי מלאכת המשכן ימים רבים היה, שהרי בשבעה עשר בתמוז נשתברו הלוחות, וביום הכפורים נתרצה הקדוש ברוך הוא לישראל, ולמחרת התחילו בנדבת המשכן והוקם באחד בניסן:

Rashi is based on *Midrash Tanchuma, Ki Tissa* 31:

עשה שם אלול כלו ועשרה מתשרי וירד בעשור והיו ישראל שרוים בתפלה ותענית ובו ביום נאמר לו למשה סלחתי כדברך וקבעו הקדוש ברוך הוא יום סליחה ומחילה לדורות שנאמר (ויקרא טז) כי ביום הזה יכפר עליכם לטהר, ומיד צוה לו למשה ועשו לי מקדש (שמי' כה:8).

8. Meir Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading*, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1987, makes this point for the Bible itself. Lev.25:1 begins, “And the Lord spoke to Moses in the desert of Sinai”, precisely because one would expect all revelation in Leviticus to be emanating from the Tent of Meeting, i.e. the Tabernacle. In other words, the Bible itself points out irregularities in chronology.
9. Isaac B. Gottlieb, *Order in the Bible*, Ramat-Gan: Magnes Press/Bar-Ilan University Press, 2009 (Hebrew).

Our Daf

R. Menashya bar Tachlifa said in the name of Rav: This means that there is no chronological order in the Torah.

R. Pappa said: We only say this about two passages, but within one passage, there is chronological order. Were it not so, [the principle]^[11] “A generalization followed by a specification, the generalization does not include anything not in the specification” [would be meaningless] — perhaps it is a specification followed by a generalization? Additionally, [the principle] “A specification followed by a generalization, the generalization adds to the specification” — perhaps it is a generalization followed by a specification?

If this is true, even for two passages this should be true. This is consistent with the view that “If a generalization and a specification are distant from each other, we do not apply the rules of generalization and specification’, but can one say this according to the view that do we apply the rules?

"Ein Mukdam" (and Other Compositional Elements)⁸

Ein mukdam Earliest Mentions

Ein Mukdam is the 32nd and last rule of R. Yosef Haglili's baraita of 32 rules for understanding the Torah. It is not included in Hillel or r. Yishmael's shorter lists. The baraita is at the end of masechet brachot (yonaton kolatch).

The Sifri: "*And Hashem spoke to Moshe in the desert of Sinai in the second year from the exodus from Egypt in the first month, saying... (Num 9,1)*"

The verse speaks to detriment of Bnei Yisrael for it was 11 months that they were encamped in front of Mount Sinai, to teach that there is no earlier and later in the Torah (ein mukdam umeuchar btorah). For in the beginning of the volume (of Num) it states: And Hashem spoke to Moshe in the desert of Sinai in the Tent of Meeting on the first of second month in the second

⁸ <https://sites.google.com/site/shlorydtorah/composite-torah/-ein-mukdam>

year...and here (in a later section) it says in the first month - to teach that ein mukdam umeuchar batorah[1].

Rebbi says -one does not need it for it already states (Ex. 16): "and Bnei Yisrael ate the manna 40 years until they came to inhabited land." So (at this point when the story of the manna is first being told we are being informed about what happened 40 years later) they have not yet eaten (from the produce of the inhabited land). That teaches you that ein mukdam umeauchar batorah (Sifri Num 9). (http://www.avakesh.com/2007/05/the_narrator_an.html)

The first is a Parshah out of chronology, based on how the narrator introduces the parshiot.

and the second is a pasuk out of chronology, where the third person narration, all of a sudden, becomes omniscient. (This might line-up with the debate on Pesachim 6b about whether the concept only applies to Parshiot, and not individual pesukim.)

Ein mukdam: Explicit vs implicit

there is no debate over these types of ein Mukdam--they are time-stamped by the narrator. It's the implicit examples there debated, where there is no mention of timing. These examples often involve the entering and exiting a space, the presence or absence of a character.

A) 5 explicit ein Mukdam examples

in his comments in the start of parshat yitro he seems to state a thesis: "Karov ayleye likroh hatorah be-Seder." However, there are a few examples where the Ramban explicitly says that he accepts ein Mukdam. The most obvious example is Num 9:1, which due to the time-stamp on Num 1:1, is the gemaras archetypal examples.

In parshat Acharei Mot, Vayikra 16:1, the Ramban states that the parshat is an example of "mefurash" ein Mukdam. He mentions two other examples vayikra 25:1 (behar Sinai) and Num

7:1 (nesiim inauguration). So, including Num 1:1 from the Gemara, these are his archetypal examples of ein Mukdam:

- 1) Vayikra 16:1 (acherei mot)
- 2) vayikra 25:1 (behar Sinai)
- 3) Num 1:1 (second month)]
- 4) Num 7:1 (nesiim inauguration)
- 5) Num 9:1 (first month)

It's odd that he includes Num 7:1. On the one hand, it's a repeat of the events from Shemot 40, rather than a simple time-shift. Also, He does not include Vayikra 9:1 (the repetition of inauguration--rewinding 7 days), and Num 9:15 (which repeats the last pasukim of Ex 40). All three of four of these pesukim seem to repeat the same day, the day of the inauguration of the mishkan.

The Pesach Shani time shift (at first seems like it) is actually a better/more straightforward example than the miluim in Vayikra. This is because it doesn't create a repetition or contradiction, in contrast with mishkan construction/dedication examples. But it's misleading to point to time-stamps on Num 1 :1 and 9:1, which give a "date" but seem to be arbitrary chronological shift. The overarching pattern is that between Shemot 40 and Num 9:15, there are two other shifts back to the construction/ dedication of mishkan, in Vayikra 9 and Num 7. The division of the sefarim, which give more attention to the beginnings of Sefer Vayikra and Sefer Num also obscures that pattern.

The traditional commentators don't seem to take note of this--they say ein Mukdam and try and reconstruct the timeline. Ramban and Chizkuni are very interested in figuring out chronology. They want to put all the pieces of the dedication of the mishkan together. But they don't seem to think it is odd that time keeps shifting back and forth around the day of dedication.

The source critics don't take note because they attribute all of these repetitions to just one source.

Menachem Leibtag⁹ notices the three repetitions and seems to find a thematic reason to divide the story into different pieces. He writes: *"It is this nature of a collective effort, where everyone must be alike and work together towards a common goal, yet at the same time keep his own identity and shine as an individual, that makes room for God..."* Though he barely notes how uniquely odd this structure is within the Torah. The mishkan spans such a large portion of the five books, and the two-three other explicit ein Mukdam time-stamps are contained within it.

The mishkan repetitions could be compared to the way that midrashim and Rashi see a three-fold repetition by har sinai: Ex 19, 24:1, and 24:12?. But the difference is that by hat Sinai the repetition is not explicit. So it is debated, and some (Ibn Ezra?) reject all of it. Perhaps, its closer to compare the mishkan repetition to the repetition of the day of man's creation in Gen 1:1, 2:6 and 5:1. But there too, Ramban does not use the term ein Mukdam. he would rather say a variation on "chazar be-perush"... so he seems to be drawing a distinction...

B) some confusing examples

1) One type of confusing example is when the Ramban says "chazar ve-perush" like with the first pasuk of Breishit.

2) the pesukim after the aseret hedibrot. This is the Ramban's most flagrant use of ein Mukdam -no one else thinks to make this argument! he is clearly saying that it happened "kodem" to the dibrot, but he does not use that phrase.

3) in va-yelech, Deut 31:24, "ke-chalot Moshe lichtov et ha-torah ha-zot." He seems to agree with Ibn Ezra's that the pesukim are "Makdim" but then ends by saying everything happened like the "Seder" of the Torah.

3) Another category is when the Ramban mentions ein Mukdam, and doesn't reject it, but doesn't seem to prefer them. He does this by discussing parshat Vayikra in Shemot 40:2. he quotes the ein Mukdam statement of r. Yishmael and states that he is not sure if it is a singular opinion or the majority opinion. (How does he put it by birchat kohanim in bahaalotcha being the same bracha as in parshat shemini???)

⁹ http://www.jhsonline.org/Articles/article_176.pdf

C) examples Ramban rejects

- 1) *lech-Letha - is this explicit????*
- 2) *Yitro's arrival (Shemot 19)*
- 3) *Naaseh ve-nishma (Shemot 24) is this explicit????*
- 4) *mishkan instructions (Shemot 25)*
- 5) *Num 8:5 - korach*

Shtei Bechinot vs. "b'dibur Echad"

Bazak and Leibtag see Breuer's

"systematic application of the "aspects approach," rooted in the idea of "*dibbur echad*". Bazak writes: "*this approach has much earlier – perhaps even ancient – roots. The most obvious foundation for such an approach would seem to be found in the well-known teaching of Chazal, that appears in a number of variations, concerning contradictory verses that were said "as a single utterance" (be-dibbur echad):*

"*'Shav' and 'shaker' emerged as a single utterance, which is impossible for the human mouth to say, or for the ear to perceive; 'Zakhor' and 'shamor'*^[2] *emerged as a single utterance, which is impossible for the human mouth to say, or for the ear to perceive; 'Those who desecrate it shall be put to death' (Shemot 31:14) and 'Two lambs of the first year, without blemish' (Num28:9) emerged as a single utterance, which is impossible for the human mouth to say, or for the ear to perceive;*^[3]*'You shall not uncover the nakedness of your brother's wife' (Vayikra 18:16) and 'Her husband's brother shall go to her' (Devarim 25:5) emerged as a single utterance ...*^[4] *And so it is written, 'One thing was said by God' – in speech, 'yet two things have I heard' (Tehillim 62:12), and it is written, 'Is My word not like a fire, says the Lord; like a hammer that shatters rock' (Yirmiyahu 23:29)."* (*Yerushalmi, Nedarim* chapter 3; col. 37d

However, Breuer himself did not make this connection to "b'dibur Echad". Perhaps because the Gemara only applied it to legal contradictions, not to narrative contradictions (or disjunctions--what exact terminology did Breuer use?) or perhaps because these are examples of single pesukim, rather than whole Parshiot. But just as other concepts, like "lashon bnei Adam" and "clal uprat", started out as legal concepts too. They were expanded to apply to narrative problems, so why not this concept too. "lashon Bnei Adam" evolved from how it was first employed by tannaim for halachic exegesis. Eventually Breuer would employ it as well, turning it on its head.

The most famous example of "be-dibbur echad" is certainly Shamor and zachor. In Shemot Ibn Ezra strongly disagrees with this interpretation. He argues that it certainly can't be applied to the contradictions in the rest of the dibrot. But his logic could be applied to argue the opposite: that if you use this concept to explain Shamor and Zachor, then you might as well use it for the rest of the dibrot.

Breuer's Shtei bechinot takes bdibur echad and changes it in a number of ways: (a) he applies it globally to the entire Breishit, if not the whole Torah. Therefore, every pasuk must belong to one of two divine "documents." (B) He applies it to both sequential Parshiot and series of intertwined pesukim.

Ein Mukdam and Shtei Bechinot

Both the concepts of Shtei bechinot and ein Mukdam point to a composite text--and brings out questions about integration. Bin-nun is bothered by his sense that once Breuer locates the distinct threads, he can't imagine how they could be integrated into a whole. The same issue comes up with the secular version of the documentary hypothesis, and (I believe) that's one reason why scholars like Whybray put forth the "fragmentary hypothesis." this less rigid and systematic hypothesis could be said to be parallel to a more-local concept of "b'dibur echad".

If differences are highlighted, how can composite-ness be overcome? While ein Mukdam at first seems like a method of waving away logical problems in narrative, it actually just shifts the problem into explaining a strong thematic connection for the new placement of the text, as the Ramban points out. Shtei bechinot also calls on practitioner to analyze thematic distinctions.

But what if the placement of the parsha with its ambiguous chronology and connections did not have to be resolved on one side or the other? What if the ambiguity pointed to both possibilities simultaneously? Perhaps, the narrative does not require resolution for the ambiguity, nor a final integrated text. Then the concept of ein Mukdam seems similar to Shtei bechinot in yet another way: both leave questions unresolved and integration open-ended.

Some academics writing about kabalistic doctrines describe ein Mukdam using terms like "anachronic" or "simultaneity". They interpret this concept as not just switching the sequences of text, but that the text itself is unmoored from time. (Find: S. Talmon, "The Presentation of Synchronicity and Simultaneity in Biblical Narrative")

"Logic" seems to dictate that it is easier to leave ambiguity of ein Mukdam unresolved than contradictions of shtei bechinot... but is this just because both of them work better with parshiot rather than psukim? "Shtei Bechinot" certainly "works" better with consecutive longer passages like with 2 creation stories, than with composite Noach story. There the "logic" breaks down when there are intertwined passages that are more subtly contradictory.

The Gemara argues about whether ein Mukdam can be applied to individual pesukim. If Tosfot's extreme example by Eliezer was repeated consecutively, it might be just as difficult as Breuers analysis of lech Letha. It seems to make no sense to intertwine passages at such a granular level--whether by Shtei bechinot or by ein Mukdam?!

Furthermore, Breuer does not give an explanation for why shtei bechinot are intertwined in different levels of granularity--by parshiot or by psukim. Ironically, in this way, he is similar to the academic documentarians.

Derech Ketzara (Minhag Ha-Katuv)

Whether accepting ein Mukdam or not, there is yet another concept in play by Ibn Ezra, Radak and Chizkuni. they sometimes say that repetitions can omit important details the first time (derech katzar) and the later return with more of an explanation.

Rashi mentions it in instances where words seem to be missing from pesukim, but does not mention it in the sense of omission of narrative description.

This idea is diametrically opposed to Shtei bechinot: on the one hand, it can be applied as an alternate explanation of most Shtei bechinot examples. On the other hand, this concept/tool/theory is completely unnecessary for Shtei bechinot. There is no missing "Aruch" version, when pshat is being examined so carefully. The literal words are so important that they are used as a guide to break up texts into more "coherent, original documents."

In his introduction, and in long essay by the luchot, Ibn Ezra's discusses his theory of Moshe's repetitious, but inexact, speech. He suggests that is that "milim" are like bodies, "taamim" are like souls. The "bodies" can change, while meaning stays the same. And All narration could work the same way. The first time an event could be longer and more detailed the second time shorter and more general.

Ramban doesn't like that phrase but often makes the same point when he says something like "hakatuv lo ratzah le-faresh." By "Yom hashimini" the Ramban explicitly rejects the concept of "katzer u-perush. but he says that commands or actions are often omitted. So, although he does not use the phrase "katzer," he often seems to be adding details to fill lacunae. He does not

use the term "katzer" by Kayin's naming re hevel, and says there is a hidden "sod". he does not use that term To describe pesukim of avraham being told to "lech-Letha" from his family's home. But his explanation of extra details to clarify the logic implies that there was missing information.

The Only time I found is Shemot 40:2 - Ramban also mentions that "lo perush... kitzer kaan" putting up the whole mishkan, because instructions were already given earlier with the details.

Clal u prat and Ein Mukdam

Expansion of concepts for: 1) Lashon bnei Adam, 2) ein Mukdam, 3) clal u-prat

Even according to the view that we do apply the rules, this is true only within one passage, but between two passages, we do not apply them.

What is the relationship between Mukdam UmeUchar Batorah and Klal Uprat/Prat Uklal.

The order of the Torah is not chronology order, however there is the order of written, the same order Moshe got the Torah the same order he wrote it, this order implies the Derachim ShehaTorah Nilmedet Bahem even if spanned in two Inyanim. Why then the chronology order is important?

It seems from **RASHI** (DH Ein Mukdam, and DH d'Iy Lo Teima Hachi) that the concept of "*Ein Mukdam...*" refers not only to the historical events in the Torah not being written in the same chronological order as the order in which they occurred, but also to all the details of the Mitzvos that Hashem told to Moshe Rabeinu.

That is, if it is true that the historical events were not written in the order in which they occurred, for whatever reason that may be (for example, perhaps they were written in a logical order, to facilitate learning them), then that same criteria would determine the order of the Mitzvos and details of the Mitzvos (that is, non-events).

If so, we would not be able to apply the tools of Prat u'Klal, since other factors besides Drush determined the order of the words in the Torah, and Hash-m would have had to give us other methods of Drush that do not depend upon the order of the verses. Proof to this is that even by

changing the *chronology* alone, we affect the Drush (as in our Sugya, where an extra Gezeirah Shavah is necessary because of Ein Mukdam u'Me'uchar ba'Torah), and yet the Torah goes ahead and changes the chronology.

The Gemara concludes that in a single Parsha, the importance of preserving the Drush through Klal u'Perat etc. wins out and therefore no other factors besides the Drush are involved in determining the order of the words/verses.

Because of this, the chronology of events in a single Parsha will be preserved as well.

Study of the Halachos of Pesach

שואלין דורשין בהלכות הפסח

The Rebbe Reb Elimelech of Lizhensk was partaking of a meal with the Rav of a small town when he realized that the Rav wasn't eating. After repeated inquiries, the Rav admitted that he was indeed fasting. When asked why, he explained that he fasted to beseech Hashem to protect his townspeople from sin. To this R' Elimelech replied that the way for a Rav to protect his flock is not through fasting, but by a thorough study of the entire Shulchan Aruch.

R' Elimelech continued to explain that it was for the same reason that he recommended that the Rav must learn Hilchos Pesach very carefully. People tend to think that Pesach generates so many halachic questions because of its complicated and unusually strict laws. While that is certainly true, there is yet another reason for this phenomenon. That is because the many Poskim and Geonim who wrote commentaries on Hilchos Pesach complained in Heaven that nobody studied their commentaries because they were all busy cleaning.

This is why Hashem causes so many halachah questions to arise, specifically in the area of hilchos Pesach, so that they be learned properly and not forgotten. For that reason, the Rav's studying of all halachos properly would be the best protection for his flock.